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Abstract 
 
 
With the growth of the economies worldwide the debate between shareholder 
and stakeholder capitalism has never been more intense than nowadays. Each 
country though incorporates this debate differently in its interior market since its 
corporate governance’s structures present distinguished characteristics. Thus, by 
brining into this debate countries like Germany and the USA, the distinction 
between shareholders and stakeholders’ interests becomes clearer. Countries based 
on the Anglo-Saxon business model like the USA are in favor of a “shareholder 
primacy” based system setting as their optimal goal the maximization of 
shareholder value. On the other hand, countries like Germany seem to have a 
stronger preference for a stakeholder based system. Both countries though 
throughout the years have been tested to incorporate into their corporate 
governance structure models stemming from the opposite side.  
Thus, the USA despite its stable preference for satisfying fiercely its 
shareholders’ interests have recently started to embrace views stemming from 
satisfying stakeholder value, adopting notions such as codetermination and public 
benefit corporation. At the same time, Germany despite its rigid stakeholder 
preference, for improving its position in the global business arena has been 
proposed to become more tolerant versus shareholders’ needs. Finally, in both 
countries efforts are made to satisfy both shareholders and stakeholders’ interests. 
However, the percentage of this satisfaction defers based on the needs of the 
corporations of each country. 
 
 
 
Key words: Shareholder value, stakeholder value, corporate governance, Germany, 
USA, shareholder capitalism, management.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The following paper is about the topic “Shareholder vs. Stakeholder Capitalism”. This paper 
is part of the seminar “Comparative Corporate Governance”.  One of the most important 
questions in the field of corporate governance is the question about an overall goal for 
business. The two most famous models in this regard are the shareholder and stakeholder 
approach. Even though both terms lack one clear definition since they have a lot of sub-
theories, which differ in accentuation and other details, they both stipulate a certain 
philosophy how to run business and in particular big corporations. 
  
This paper will take a look at the influence these theories have on corporate governance in the 
USA and in Germany. The paper is divided in four sections. Section 2. will explain 
shareholder and stakeholder capitalism and explore the origin of them. Afterwards Section 3. 
will try to find indications in the German (corporate) law, which point to impacts of either one 
of the approaches. Section 4. will do the same for the US law. Section 5. then will be the main 
comparative part.  
 
2. The Theories 
 
This first part will explain what share- and stakeholder capitalism is and will explore the 
origin of these philosophies. 
 
2.1. What is shareholder capitalism? 
 
The term shareholder theory or also shareholder value approach can refer to different ideas.  
The term shareholder value approach is a term out of the field of business economics and 
refers to a particular way of dynamic investment calculation.
1
 It was invented by Rappaport 
who searched for a new as precise as possible method of measuring the value created by 
corporations.
2
 Shareholder value is oriented towards an average diversified shareholder who 
wants maximum profit from his investment in shares.
3
 Still in other fields than business 
economics the term shareholder theory usually means something different, namely a guiding 
                                                 
1 
Mühlbert, Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht 1997, 26 (2), 129, 130. 
2
 Rappaport, Creating Shareholder Value. 
3
 Kuhner, Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht 2004, 33 (2), 244, 262. 
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principle for operating a business, which gives the interests of shareholders the highest 
priority.
4
 Therefore the objective is to maximize the value of the corporation’s shares because 
that is obviously the main interest of shareholders.
5
 
 
This concept of the shareholder approach is mainly concerned with the principal-agent-
relationship between shareholders and management.
6
 The standard argument for the need to 
prioritize the shareholder interests is the fact that investors (shareholders) are not protected by 
contracts like all other corporate units dealing with the corporation.
7
 For the purposes of this 
paper the term shareholder capitalism or approach will refer to a system, which gives the 
interests of shareholders the highest priority and will therefore first and foremost try to create 
maximum value for them. 
 
2.2. What is stakeholder capitalism? 
 
Even more than the term shareholder approach the term of stakeholder approach is highly 
ambiguous, if not controversial.
8
 There are multiple „theories“and concepts involving the 
term stakeholder, which come to different conclusions and have accentuations.
9
 The term 
surely is multi-dimensional and can be described as having descriptive, instrumental and at 
core normative levels
10
. 
 
The fundamental idea of the stakeholder approach is to consider interests of corporate groups 
other than just those of shareholders.
11
 These interests do not need to be considered for the 
sake of the shareholders but for their own sake. They have an own intrinsic value.
12
 For that 
reason stakeholder capitalism judges the performance of a corporation by a broad spectrum of 
parameters,
 13
 and not only by the performance of the shares. The subsequent question which 
interests need to be considered, ergo who the stakeholders are is answered inconsistently. 
Freeman defined stakeholders very broadly as “any group or individual who can affect or is 
                                                 
4
 Werder, Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht 1998, 27 (1), 69, 74. 
5
 Mühlbert, Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht 1997, 26 (2), 129, 131 f.. 
6
 Werder, Führungsorganisation, 8. 
7
 Werder, in: Hommelhoff/Hopt/Werder (Publ.), Handbuch Corporate Governance, 3, 8. 
8
 Miles, Journal of Business Ethics 2012, 108 (3), 285, 295, concluding that the concept is actually contested. 
9
 Scherer/Patzer, in: Phillips (Publ.), Shareholder Theory. Impact and Prospects, 140, 141 f.. 
10
 Donaldson/Preston, Academy of Management Review 1995, 20 (1), 65, 66 f.. 
11
 Werder, in: Hommelhoff/Hopt/Werder (Publ.), Handbuch Corporate Governance, 3, 8. 
12
 Donaldson/Preston, Academy of Management Review 1995, 20 (1), 65, S. 67. 
13
 Mayer, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 1998, 154 (1), 144, 146. 
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affected by the achievements of the firm’s objectives”.
14
 It is with no doubt still necessary to 
further differentiate between different stakeholders since their interests and influence can vary 
heavily.
15
  
 
In spite of the multi-interest considerations the stakeholder approach is not necessarily dealing 
with social issues. Broad social concerns and stakeholder considerations do not have to be the 
same
16
 and stakeholder theory is actually not an underlying concept of Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR).
17
 The stakeholder approach is thought to be a strategic approach to 
business making. So it is not about taking the interests of the whole society into consideration 
and assuming a responsibility towards it, but about understanding and using the relationships 
between the corporation and the groups that have a stake in it
 
so that the best possible 
economic result can be reached.  
 
So the stakeholder approach at core requires decision makers to identify the legitimate 
stakeholder and their interests first, then weigh and balance the latter against each other and 
finally make their choice on that basis.
18
 How to finally make those choices is up to the 
decision makers. There also is no overall agreement on what the overall goal of stakeholder 
theory is. One idea is to make long term value maximization the goal
19
 since only by means of 
pursuing maximization of value created all corporate units and society as a whole can 
benefit.
20
 
 
Another idea puts the balancing of stakeholder interest in the center and makes the 
coordination of those interests the objective of the corporation.
21
 For the purposes of this 
paper stakeholder capitalism will refer to the strategic multi-interest consideration for the sake 
of corporations and not to an idea how to bring ethical values into business. So in short it will 
refer to the broad idea that a firm can and will be run more efficiently if not only the interests 
                                                 
14
 Freeman, Strategic Management, 25. 
15
 Cohen, Business & Professional Ethics Journal 1996, 15 (2), 3, 5; also Mitchell/Agle/Wood, Academy of 
Management Review 1997, 22 (4), 853, 882. 
16
 Clarkson, Academy of Management Review 1995, 20 (1), 92, 100. 
17
 Elms/Johnson-Cramer/Berman, in: Phillips (Publ.), Shareholder Theory. Impact and Prospects, 1, 1 f..; 
Hansen/Bode/Moosmayer, Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Unternehmensethik 2004, 5 (3), 242, 251, think CSR 
surpasses stakeholder theory. 
18
 Goodpaster, Business Ethics Quarterly, 1 (1), 53, 56. 
19
 See Jensen, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 2001, 14 (3), 8, 9, who calls this “enlightened stakeholder 
theory”. 
20
 Jensen, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 2001, 14 (3), 8, 11 f.. 
21
 Evan/Freeman, in: Beauchamp/Bowie (Publ.), Ethical Theory and Business, 97, 103. 
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of its shareholders but also of other parties which have a legitimate interest in the corporation 
are taken into consideration. No interest is predetermined to be more important than another. 
The decisions are based on a complete consideration of all interests or rather stakes, what 
includes identification, analysis and making the necessary trade-offs.  
 
2.3. Origin and development of the theories 
 
Like with most concepts and theories is it hard to clearly identify the real origin of those 
theories. Nonetheless it is important to at least have a rough idea where they come from to 
really understand them. Emphasis will be laid on the development of these concepts in the 
USA and in Germany.  
 
The origin of the underlying problem, which interests need to be considered in corporate 
decision-making (at all or primarily), can be dated back to the 1930s. After identifying a 
dispersed ownership structure of US corporations,
22
 Berle and Means provided the 
cornerstone for this in their book “The Modern Corporation and Private Property”
23
 by stating 
that ownership and control of corporations are separated. The book focused on the 
relationship between management and shareholders. They identified a very strong 
management and weak shareholders with small influence.
24
 To keep the managers from self-
interested conduct, they proposed that managers be obliged with fiduciary duties for the 
benefit of the shareholders. Even though they did not use a term like shareholder theory, 
approach or capitalism this can be seen as a starting point for shareholder capitalism in the 
US.
25
  
 
The origin of the stakeholder approach in the US can also be dated back to the 1930s. The 
forerunner of the stakeholder approach was Merrick Dodd.
26
 As a reaction to the trust law 
analogy by Berle and Means in which the managers are fiduciaries to the corporation’s 
shareholders, Dodd opposed that managers are trustees to the whole institution of the firm 
                                                 
22
 Means, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 1930, 44 (4), 561, 591. 
23
 Berle/Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property. 
24
 Berle/Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, 277. 
25
 Gelter, NYU Journal of Law & Business 2011, 7 (2), 641, 650 f.. 
26
 Gelter, NYU Journal of Law & Business 2011, 7 (2), 641, 666; See also Dodd, Harvard Law Review 1932, 45 
(7), 1145, 1154. 
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rather than just to the shareholders.
27
 In Germany a similar understanding of the corporation 
as an autonomous unit already existed at the beginning of the nineteenth century.
28 
This 
institutional view of the corporation suits the stakeholder approach better than for example the 
contractarian theory since it establishes a unit whose interest the management has to respect 
and shareholders are a non-exclusive part of that unit.
29
 
 
However these were still far away from using the term stakeholder and the more mature 
stakeholder approach ideas of today. An important forerunner for the stakeholder approach in 
Germany then was Walther Rathenau.
30
 He was very skeptical about a strong influence of 
shareholders,
31
 in particular of speculative investors.
32
 Thus the idea was to keep the 
shareholders out of the decision-making as much as possible. 
  
The rationale behind this would be: the freer the managers are from any undue influence 
(especially from shareholders) when it comes to making business decision, the better the final 
decisions for the corporation. This is basically the complete opposite position to Berle and 
Means who wanted to bind the managers with fiduciary duties to the shareholders of the 
corporation.
33
  So their idea was to give the managers less discretion and freedom in making 
corporate decisions by means of giving the shareholders more power and establishing 
fiduciary duties whereas the idea of Rathenau was to give managers more discretion by 
strengthening the management. Conclusions deriving from that fact will be made at the end of 
this section. 
 
Both streams of thought continued to develop over the course of the twentieth century. The 
stakeholder idea remained the leading approach to corporate governance in Germany not least 
because of the enactment of the old § 70 German Stock Corporation Act in 1937 and the 
developing concept of the „Unternehmensinteresse“,
34
 which was very much in line with 
Institutional theories of the corporation.  
 
                                                 
27
 Dodd, Harvard Law Review 1932, 45 (7), 1145, 1160. 
28
 Gelter, NYU Journal of Law & Business 2011, 7 (2), 641, 665. 
29
 Gelter, NYU Journal of Law & Business 2011, 7 (2), 641, 667. 
30
 Gelter, NYU Journal of Law & Business 2011, 7 (2), 641, 680-683. 
31
 Rathenau, Vom Aktienwesen, 26 f.. 
32
 Rathenau, Vom Aktienwesen, 27 f.. 
33
 See Gelter, NYU Journal of Law & Business 2011, 7 (2), 641, 683 and 688. 
34
 Gelter, NYU Journal of Law & Business 2011, 7 (2), 641, 695. 
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The actual terms and concepts of stakeholder approach and shareholder value management 
like we know them today came up or rather gained popularity not before the 1980s. During 
that time the market for hostile corporate takeovers was evolving in the US and managing in 
the interest of shareholders was re-emphasized.
35
 In addition the significance of the capital 
market and institutional investors increased in the US but Germany as well.
36
 During that time 
span Rappaport developed the business economic idea of creating shareholder value as 
mentioned above, which some years later also became popular in Germany.
37 
In 1984 Edward 
Freeman published a book about the “stakeholder approach” from a business strategic 
perspective.
38
 The term stakeholder was popularized by Freeman’s book
39
, even though it was 
invented earlier
40
 and used in different ways before 1984. 
 
Again the terms continued to develop further on and can even be called ambiguous today 
because of different ideas and theories that did or did not and even might or might not end up 
changing the overall understanding of the two overarching approaches to governance. 
After all there are some valuable conclusion that can be drawn from this exploration of the 
origin of the two governance approaches. 
 
These conclusions become most apparent looking at the initial ideas of Berle and Means on 
one hand and Rathenau on the other. As already stated before the idea of Berle and Means 
was to protect the corporation of the powerful managers dealing in self-interest whereas 
Rathenau intended to empower the management to protect the corporation of its shareholders. 
In result it can be concluded that the shareholder approach tends to constrain managers and 
the stakeholder approach on the other side tends to empower them.
41 
Looking at this and the 
different ownership structures in the US and in Germany back then (and in big parts still 
today) the conclusion that can also be drawn is that the local shareholder influence had a 
major effect on how people thought about the relation between management and shareholders.  
 
As already mentioned above the ownership of big corporations in the US was and is 
dispersed. The influence the shareholders can have is therefore severely limited. Germany on 
                                                 
35
 Gelter, NYU Journal of Law & Business 2011, 7 (2), 641, 651 f.. 
36
 Gelter, NYU Journal of Law & Business 2011, 7 (2), 641, 698. 
37
 Werder, Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht 1998, 27 (1), 69, 69. 
38
 Freeman, Strategic Management.  
39
 Freeman, Strategic Management, 31-43 describing different uses until 1984. 
40
 And first used in the Stanford Research Institue, Freeman, Strategic Management, 31 f.. 
41
 Gelter, NYU Journal of Law & Business 2011, 7 (2), 641, 678. 
 
 11 
the other hand was characterized by block-holders, meaning shareholders who own a huge 
amount of shares of a corporation. Because of this concentration the influence on the 
management can and will be more drastic.
42
 
 
It then becomes a task of balancing power. If shareholders are too weak the corporation is 
susceptible for managers dealing in self-interest. If the shareholders are too strong all non-
shareholder corporate groups are susceptible for “hold-up”-problems
43
.  To balance power in 
the first case of too weak shareholders, management has to be constrained in some way. For 
example by binding the management to work as fiduciaries for the shareholders. The goal 
then is to maximize value for the corporation’s stockholders (this would be the shareholder 
approach). 
 
In the other case of too strong shareholders, corporate decision makers need to have enough 
power to be able to act independently from the shareholders. So the solution to balance the 
power in this case is to give managers the right to consider and prioritize interests of non-
shareholder corporate units (this would be the stakeholder approach).
44 
This conclusion also 
suggests that there might not be a perfect approach to corporate governance but just different 
“local optima” adapted to the respective surroundings.
45
 It also suggests that both approaches 
are in reality just ways to find the balance of power between the different corporate units that 
is best for the corporation. 
 
However it is certain that the approaches are not just some idea of individual persons but 
rather the results of different surroundings and problems which changed and by that means 
also changed the ideas how to best approach corporate governance. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
42
 Gelter, Harvard International Law Review 2009, 50 (1), 129, 133. 
43
 Meaning the problem that one party can take advantage of a relationship or a contract due to overpowering 
influence of one party combined with little protection of the other. See in that regard Goldberg, American 
Behavioral Scientist 1980, 23 (3), 337, 339-341, explaining the “hold-up” situation. 
44
 Gelter, Harvard International Law Review 2009, 50 (1), 129, 144-168 explains that line of thought in depth. 
45
 Gelter, Harvard International Law Review 2009, 50 (1), 129, 177 (See Table 1 regarding the differing “local 
optima”). 
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Comparative Table between Germany and USA regarding share- and stakeholder 
capitalism 
Categories Germany USA 
 
 
Shareholders 
Arguably most important group 
of stakeholders; trend towards 
increased focus on creation of 
shareholder value. 
“Shareholder primacy” 
All the modern American corporate 
Governance thought is based on this 
notion. 
 
Stakeholders 
Protected through a stakeholder 
friendly legal framework. 
Under US Securities Law there is not 
any explicit obligation to consider non-
shareholder interests. Stakeholders’ 
interests not really protected.    
Management (Two-tier Corporate Governance 
Structure): 
Broad discretion in terms of 
overall orientation. 
(One-tier Corporate Governance 
Structure):  
Board has discretion in terms of overall 
orientation. Maximization of 
Shareholder value. 
Social Responsibility 
of Corporations 
No general duty; in the 
discretion of management. 
No general duty, in the discretion of 
management. Recently creation of 
“Benefit Corporations”.  
 
Role of the legislator 
Sets legal framework  
responsible for stakeholder 
considerations. National 
corporate law. 
 US Securities Law deals with Federal 
issues (shareholders’ interests). 
Otherwise, each state law diversifies 
itself. Delaware law-most important 
state law for corporations. 
 
Codetermination 
Worker codetermination very 
extensive: almost parity on 
boards of big corporations  
Worker codetermination not taken into 
account. No worker representatives on 
boards. 
Role of Banks Intervene directly in 
corporation’s management.  
Commercial banks are forbidden to 
intervene in corporation’s management. 
 
3. German Part 
 
This Part will explore the German (corporate) legal system in search of indications for a 
share- or stakeholder capitalistic system.  
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As explained in depth before shareholder capitalism will in that regard refer to a system that 
gives the interest of the shareholders, thus the maximization of the share value, the highest 
priority. Whereas stakeholder capitalism will mean a system in which the interests of all 
corporate groups will be considered (equally). 
 
Since German law is said to traditionally be very stakeholder capitalistic, this part will start by 
taking a look at the German development of both orientations and the stakeholder orientation 
in particular, will then continue to examine different relevant laws and conclude with a quick 
look on future trends in regard to the overall approach. 
 
3.1. Development and local circumstances in Germany 
 
Even though the German legal scholar Otto v. Gierke was one of the first to develop a theory 
of a (in the broadest sense) corporation as an entity that is to a certain degree independent 
from its members in the 19
th
 century,
46
 the actual development of something like the 
stakeholder approach in Germany started with Walther Rathenau.
47
 
 
Until that time the understanding of the corporation was very shareholder-centric, with the 
shareholder meeting as the most important body in terms of choosing corporate direction.
48
 
As mentioned above, Rathenau was worried about too much shareholder influence and 
wanted to protect the corporation from this, in his view detrimental, influence.
49
 At the same 
time he was one of the first to draw a connection between the corporation and public issues,
50
 
due to the size of some of the corporations and their influence on the national economy. 
 
Even though these ideas did not have an extensive influence on the legal scholars during that 
time and were even criticized,
51
 they might have influenced the development of the enterprise 
                                                 
46 
Gierke, Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht. 
47 
See Section 2.3. 
48
 Gelter, NYU Journal of Law & Business 2011, 7 (2), 641, 680; also Langenbucher, Aktien- u. 
Kapitalmarktrecht, § 1, Para. 3. 
49
 Gelter, NYU Journal of Law & Business 2011, 7 (2), 641, 683. 
50
 Rathenau, Vom Aktienwesen, S. 38. 
51
 Haussmann, Vom Aktienwesen und vom Aktienrecht, S. 26, criticising that Rathenau is taking the rather 
dispersed ownership structure of the corporation which he knows as the general one, while in fact a more 
concentrated ownership structure is more common. 
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in itself (“Unternehmen an sich”)-concept about a decade later.
52
 Thus one core idea of that 
concept was that the business or the enterprise is an entity separate from its owners and that 
their influence on corporate decision-making needed to be limited.
53
 The courts during that 
time had a similar understanding in that regard. They allowed shareholders to act in their own 
interest as long as this does not go at the expense of the corporation or the minority 
shareholders without a corporate need for such behavior.
54
 
 
A big step towards a more explicit stakeholder capitalistic system was the enactment of § 70 
German Stock Corporation Act in 1937.
55
 Management was explicitly obliged to manage not 
only in the interest of the shareholders but instead to manage in the interest of the enterprise 
its retinue and the common weal of folk and realm. Most of the vocabulary was obviously 
filled with Nazi ideology,
56
 but the article still showed a strong stakeholder oriented idea of 
business at the time. Due to a lack of control mechanisms, the management had a huge 
amount of power in corporate decision-making during that time.
57
  
 
After World War II the concept of the interest of the enterprise (“Unternehmensinteresse”) 
evolving from § 70 German Stock Corporation Act (1937) became more of a focus in terms of 
guiding principles for business.
58
 Clearly not disfavoring this was the enactment of a new § 76 
German Stock Corporation Act in 1965, which is still in place today.
59
 Even though the 
wording of § 76 is obviously completely different from the one of § 70, it still left the 
management with a lot of room in decision-making,
60
 especially since this amendment was 
                                                 
52
 Gelter, NYU Journal of Law & Business 2011, 7 (2), 641, 687. 
53
 Id. 
54
 Horrwitz, Juristische Wochenschrift 1930, 59 (2), 2637, 2638. 
55
 § 70 of the German Stock Corporation Act as of January 30
th
 1937, RGBl. 1937, 107: „Der Vorstand hat unter 
eigener Verantwortung die Gesellschaft so zu leiten, wie das Wohl des Betriebs und seiner Gefolgschaft und der 
gemeine Nutzen von Volk und Reich es fordern.“ – „The managing board is, on its own responsibility, to 
manage the corporation as the good of the enterprise and its retinue and the common weal of folk and realm 
demand.“ 
56
 Vagts, Hardvard Law Review 1966, 80 (1), 23, 40. 
57
 Gelter, NYU Journal of Law & Business 2011, 7 (2), 641, 689 f.. 
58
 Gelter, NYU Journal of Law & Business 2011, 7 (2), 641, 695. 
59
 § 76 Para. 1 of the German Stock Corporation Act as of December 22
nd
 2015, BGBl. 1965, 1089: „Der 
Vorstand hat unter eigener Verantwortung die Gesellschaft zu leiten.“ – „The Management shall have direct 
responsibility for the management of the company.“  
60
 Gelter, NYU Journal of Law & Business 2011, 7 (2), 641, 696. 
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not supposed to change the legal situation in 1965.
61
  The corporation was still supposed to be 
governed by multi-interest considerations instead of a prioritization of shareholder interest.
62
  
 
The enactment of the Codetermination Act in 1976
63
 further strengthened the stakeholder 
orientation in Germany since workers now had a way to make their voice heard on the 
supervisory boards of big corporations.
64
 Asked by shareholders about the constitutionality of 
this act, the German Constitutional Court decided it was constitutional and justified this with 
a social aspect of the (share-)property of the shareholders,
65
 which was even more of a 
confirmation of a stakeholder orientation in Germany. 
 
The corporation was seen as a conglomerate of different interests.
66
 Management had very 
broad discretion and thus was allowed to take a broad spectrum of interests into consideration 
in their decision-making.
67
 It was stated that pursuing a sustainable maximum profit does not 
even have to be the corporate objective,
68
 as long as the corporation still maintained its 
profitability because without this it would not be able to sustain its functional capability over 
time.
69
 So the idea of the corporate goal was to consider the interests of the various corporate 
groups, meet them and their demands as far as possible, while just maintaining the 
functionality of the corporation. 
 
What the reason for the development of that very strong stakeholder orientation exactly was 
cannot be said with certainty. As already mentioned above, one reason might be the local 
optima relation,
70
 meaning that a strong management with a lot of discretion to consider 
stakeholder interest is necessary to keep the strong (block-)shareholders in check.
71
 In 
addition to that another factor contributing to the strongly stakeholder oriented system in 
                                                 
61
 Meyer-Landrut, in: AktG Großkomm, § 76, Para. 9. 
62
 Hopt, Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht 1993, 22 (4), 534, 536; summarizing the continued 
legal validity situation shortly is  Mühlbert, Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht 1997, 26 (2), 
129, 147 f.. 
63
 German Codetermination Act BGBl. 1976, 1153. 
64
 The German codetermination system and what deeper conclusions it allows in regard to a stakeholder 
capitalism, will be explained further in Section 3.3.1. 
65
 BVerfG March 1
st
 1979, BVerfGE 50, 290, 315 f.. 
66
 Goette, FS fünfzigjähr. Best. BGH, BAnwsch. u. RA BGH, 123, 127. 
67
 Mertens, in: Kölner Komm AktG, § 76, Para. 11. 
68
 Id. 
69
 Mertens, in: Kölner Komm AktG, § 76, Para. 22. 
70
 Again Gelter, Harvard International Law Review 2009, 50 (1), 129, 177 (See Table 1 regarding the differing 
“local optima”). 
71
 See Section 2.3. pag. 6 f.; also see again Goldberg, American Behavioral Scientist 1980, 23 (3), 337, 339-341, 
explaining the “hold-up” threat for stakeholders. 
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Germany might have been the traditional bank financing of German corporations instead of 
capital market financing.
72
 As a result there never really was a need to consider the interests 
of shareholders, which is creating maximum share value, all too much whereby the 
shareholder approach might have had a tougher stand in Germany.  
 
From the 1990s onwards the shareholder value concept gained more and more popularity and 
support in Germany through US legal scholarship, increased importance of institutional 
investors and capital markets in general and therefore increased pressure to meet the 
shareholder’s demands of value creation in their favor, ergo considering the shareholder 
value.
73
 At the latest around 2000 the idea of the shareholder value was established in 
Germany
74
 and is now playing a legit role in the question for the right overall orientation.  
 
What system is dominating the German corporate governance today and what future trends 
are already foreseeable or likely to happen, will be explored in the next sections. 
 
3.2. Management of the corporation 
 
In basically any corporation, the management is the one of the most, usually even the most, 
important and powerful body. When talking about overall goals for a corporation, one has to 
talk about goals for management, since this is the corporate organ that actually directs the 
corporation. Management is the central body especially when it comes to a share- or 
stakeholder approach to business. The underlying theories of Rappaport and Freeman were 
initially supposed to be strategic guidelines for management.
75
 Thus any duties and 
responsibilities the management has can tell a lot about the overall orientation of the system.  
 
3.2.1. Overall goals 
 
The German management is not mandated by the shareholders.
76
 Pursuant to § 119 Para. 2 
German Stock Corporation Act the shareholder meeting has no saying in management 
                                                 
72
 Kuhner, Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht 2004, 33 (2), 244, 247. 
73
 Gelter, NYU Journal of Law & Business 2011, 7 (2), 641, 698. 
74
 Groh, Der Betrieb 2010, 63 (43), 2153, 2157 f.. 
75
 Regarding the stakeholder theory Freeman, Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Unternehmensethik 2004, 5 (3), 
228, 230, in more detail Donaldson/Preston, Academy of Management Review 1995, 20 (1), 65, 85-87; 
regarding shareholder theory Rappaport, Creating Shareholder Value, 12 f.. 
76
 Weber, in: Hölters AktG, § 76, Para. 35. 
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decisions unless explicitly asked. In principle the management is therefore free from 
shareholder instructions.
77
 If you would only consider the pure wording of § 76 German Stock 
Corporation Act management would be left with almost limitless discretion and could 
basically do “anything”. Therefore the discretion and room for decision-making needs to be 
limited in some way.
78
 At this point setting an objective for management comes into play. 
 
Considering that management is the corporate organ directing the whole company, an overall 
share- or stakeholder orientation would most likely finds its strongest expression in such a 
clear goal for the corporation and its management. For that reason the legal concepts of 
management objectives in Germany and the correlating provisions will be looked at first. 
 
3.2.1.1. Legal provisions 
 
The look at the legal provisions will be limited to the most important legal provisions in 
regard to an overall orientation and objective for management.  
 
3.2.1.1.1. § 76 Para. 1 German Stock Corporation Act 
 
A very important, if not the most important, section in regard to overall business goals and 
orientation, at least in the academic debate, is the already mentioned § 76 Para. 1 German 
Stock Corporation Act. Since Germany does not have one clear statutory provision in 
corporate law that explicitly states which goals management has to pursue,
79
 this section still 
comes closest to “describe” the managerial responsibilities. Most of the debate about a share- 
or stakeholder orientation of German corporate law is linked to this provision. 
 
Together with § 93 Para. 1 Sent. 2 German Stock Corporation Act, which can be described as 
the German version of a Business Judgment Rule
80
 and gives the management discretion in 
how to manage the corporation
81
, it sets the basic legal framework for the management board.  
Still only the wording of those provisions does not give much information in terms of an 
overall orientation. The concepts of management objectives will give more information. 
                                                 
77
 Hüffer, in: Hüffer AktG, § 76, Para. 25; Kort, Die Aktiengesellschaft 2012, 57 (17), 605, 609, also stating that 
there is no fiduciary relationship between the management and the shareholders. 
78
 Also see Hüffer, FS Raiser, 163, 168. 
79
 Rittner, FS Ernst Gessler, 139, 140. 
80
 Windbichler, GesellschaftsR, § 27, Para. 33. 
81
 Spindler, in: Münchner Komm AktG, § 76, Para. 35. 
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3.2.1.1.2. Section 4.1.1 German Corporate Governance Codex 
 
Section 4.1.1
82
 and the German Corporate Governance Codex as a whole is significantly more 
explicit about management’s objectives than the entire Stock Corporation Act. Section 4.1.1 
states that the management has to manage in the interest of the enterprise, which is managing 
by taking the interests of shareholders employees and other stakeholders into consideration. 
The goal is sustainable value creation. 
 
Even though this provision does not give precise instructions it obviously is a (very 
stakeholder oriented) guideline for management.
83
 The problem is that the legislator, namely 
the German parliament, does not set the German Corporate Governance Codex but rather a 
commission. Through § 161 German Stock Corporation Act corporations are obliged to 
“comply or explain” with the Codex but the actual provisions still remain legally unbinding. 
 
Thus Section 4.1.1 gives a very clear indication of an overall orientation but due to a lack of 
democratic legitimacy
84
 it is not able to answer the question of an overall management 
objective for the whole German corporate law.
85
 
 
3.2.1.2. Concepts of goals for the management 
 
So this leaves German corporate law without a binding clear statutory provision that sets a 
clear goal for the management. In result there are multiple different concepts of management 
objectives.  
 
One basic problem of this goal-debate is again terminology. Even though this debate is far 
from new, legal scholars have not been able to agree on a universal terminology. So the same 
term can refer to slightly or even completely different ideas, concepts or facts.  
 
                                                 
82
 Section 4.1.1 of the German Corporate Governance Codex as of May 5
th
 2015, available at 
http://www.dcgk.de/en/code.html: „The Management Board is responsible for independently managing the 
enterprise in the interest of the enterprise, thus taking into account the interests of the shareholders, its employees 
and other stakeholders, with the objective of sustainable creation of value.“ 
83
 Ringleb, in: DCGK, Para. 561 f.. 
84
 Mühlbert, Die Aktiengesellschaft 2009, 54 (21), 766, 771. 
85
 See also Langenbucher, Aktien- u. KapitalmarktR, § 4, Para. 110 f.. 
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The first important thing in the debate might be a distinction between corporation 
(Gesellschaft) and enterprise (Unternehmen),
86
 even though the terminology varies
87
. While 
the corporation is a legal entity and thus can be entitled to rights and subject to obligations,
88
 
the enterprise is not. The corporation is an association of investors, while the enterprise is not 
a legal entity, but rather can be described as a unit of everyone and everything that is related 
to the actual business of the corporation, for example the production of aircrafts.
89
 This actual 
business is called the object of the enterprise, and needs to be put down in the articles of 
incorporation.
90
 But the reason why the investors are associated is not necessarily the same.
91
 
The investors may have no direct connection with the object of the enterprise. Thus the so-
called corporate purpose describes the reason for their association, which is to make profits.
92
 
So this distinction also suggests the early conclusion that one common interest, or at least 
several aligned interests characterize the corporation, whereas the enterprise is characterized 
by a multitude of different interests.
93
  
 
After distinguishing these, the next step is to take a look at the different concepts for 
corporate goals respectively goals that the management has to pursue. 
 
3.2.1.2.1. Generating profits 
 
A very popular and in a way simple corporate goal is to generate profits. So the most 
fundamental version of this argument obliges management only to pursue profitability.
94
 The 
rest is left to the discretion of the management.  
 
The fact that a corporation needs to be profitable to maintain its functionality and therefore to 
maintain the ability to satisfy all the different interests is unchallenged.
95
 The actual 
difference is that basically all other concepts do not stop at the demand of profitability. 
                                                 
86
 Early implication already in Miegel, Unternehmensbegriff, 153; also clearly rejecting an identification of the 
corporation and the enterprise is Mühlbert, Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht 1997, 26 (2), 
129, 154 f.; see also Kübler/Assmann, GesellschaftsR, 34-42. 
87
 Kübler/Assmann, GesellschaftsR, 4. 
88
 Hüffer, in: Hüffer AktG, § 1, Para. 4. 
89
 Kübler/Assmann, GesellschaftsR, 40 f.. 
90
 § 23 Sect. 3 No. 2 German Stock Corporation Act 
91
 See for the difference Pühler, in: Happ AktR, Sect. 1.01, Para. 7. 
92
 Schmidt/Spindler, FG Friedrich Kübler, 515, 535. 
93
 Hefermehl, AktG, § 76, Para. 21. 
94
 Vedder, in: Grigoleit AktG, § 76, Para. 14. 
95
 Mertens, in: Kölner Komm AktG, § 76, Para. 22. 
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3.2.1.2.2. Maximization of profits 
 
Thus another goal is the maximization instead of just generation of corporate profits.
96
 
Even though this might seem like only a slight modification of the first corporate goal, it 
really is a fundamental change. That is because the discretion of management is reduced 
drastically.
97
 While the management is able to consider the interest of all corporate parties for 
their own sake if the objective is only making profits, it can only take these interests into 
consideration as long as they are conducive for the maximization of profits.
98
 
 
3.2.1.2.3. Create shareholder value 
 
The next goal conception for management is the actual shareholder value approach proposed 
by Alfred Rappaport.
99
  
 
Since this concept is based on the economical portfolio theory
100
, the actual goal is trying to 
create maximum value for a theoretical average, ideally diversified investor.
101
 Thus this 
concept does not consider the actual shareholders of a corporation, with whom management 
might not even be familiar with, but rather the described type of diversified investor.
102
  
 
With this concept it might also seem like there is no big difference to the idea of generating or 
rather maximizing profits because that can be said to be the main interest of this type of 
shareholder. But again in fact there are substantial divergences
103
 due to the fact that profits of 
the corporation and value for shareholders do not have to be the same.
104
 
                                                 
96
 Mühlbert, Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht 1997, 26 (2), 129, 151; same thought even 
though not with regard to the German situation has Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to 
Increase its Profits (September 13
th
 1970), URL: http://thinkprayact.us/uploads/The_Social_Responsibility_ 
of_Business_is_to_Increase_its_Profits__by_Milton_Friedman.pdf (last visited on February 15
th
 2016) 
97
 Mertens, in: Kölner Komm AktG, § 76, Para. 11. 
98
 Mühlbert, Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht 1997, 26 (2), 129, 139, turns this around and 
points out that its possible that only by considering those interests to some degree the profits can be maximized. 
99
 Rappaport, Creating Shareholder Value. 
100
 Founded by Markowitz, The Journal of Finance 1952, 7 (1), 77-91. 
101
 Mühlbert, Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht 1997, 26 (2), 129, 137. 
102
 Mühlbert, Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht 1997, 26 (2), 129, 156 f.. 
103
 Mühlbert, Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht 1997, 26 (2), 129, 159-161, explaining the 
problems of potential conflicts between maximization of profits and creating maximum shareholder value. 
104
 Rappaport, Creating Shareholder Value, 20-27. 
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What is similar to the goal of profit maximization is the very narrow scope of this concept.
105
 
It gives management one clear and arguably very workable objective and only allows all other 
interest to be considered when they are conducive to that objective.
106
  
 
3.2.1.2.4. No clear goal in German corporate law 
 
The idea here is that there simply is no clearly set goal for corporations and ergo for 
management in German corporate law. The decision makers can manage the corporation in 
their own discretion and are only limited by other legal requirements.
107
 And because of the 
fact that management can only move inside the legal borders, this conception sort of gives the 
legislator an even bigger role insofar that he is required to set those borders properly, to 
ensure the retention of corporate functionality and efficiency.  
 
3.2.1.2.5. The interest of the enterprise 
 
Arguably the most influential concept in Germany is the one of the interest of the 
enterprise.
108
 As mentioned above the German Corporate Governance Codex is explicitly 
committed to this concept.
109
  
 
Despite its influence in German corporate law there is no clear, generally accepted definition 
of what exactly the interest of the enterprise is. There are several ideas and concepts of it.
110
 
Basically all of them have a multi-interest consideration in common. What is widely 
undisputed today, is that the enterprise is not a legal entity and clearly not a natural person 
and can thus not have any kind of own interest.
111
  
 
                                                 
105
 Janisch, Das Strategische Anspruchsgruppenmanagement, 103. 
106
 Rappaport, Creating Shareholder Value, 12 f., sees that other interest groups need to be taken into 
consideration to reach the objective. 
107
 Großmann, Unternehmensziele im Aktienrecht, 258 f.. 
108
 Critical is Mühlbert, Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht 1997, 26 (2), 129, 142. 
109
 Second section of the foreword to the German Corporate Governance Codex: “The Code clarifies the 
obligation of the Management Board and the Supervisory Board to ensure the continued existence of the 
enterprise and its sustainable creation of value in conformity with the principles of the social market economy 
(interest of the enterprise).“ 
110
 Mühlbert, Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht 1997, 26 (2), 129, 142 f.. 
111
 See Section 3.2.1.2. again. 
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The predominant idea of the interest of the enterprise is that it is an aggregation of all the 
interests that are related to the actual enterprise.
112
 So this includes all corporate stakeholders, 
including shareholders. To use the interest of the enterprise as a goal would then mean to 
make the balancing of those interests (part of the) objective for management.
113
 
 
The concept of the interest of the enterprise certainly was and still is contested and some even 
doubt the legal validity of it.
114
 The explanation of the legal origin of the interest of the 
enterprise, which is an implicit continued legal validity of § 70 of the German Stock 
Corporation Act of 1937, as already touched on in Section 3.1, is increasingly contested. So 
are other explanations,
115
 which are for example based on the social obligations of (share-) 
property
116
. 
 
Some are arguing that a stop to such continuation of § 70 must be proved by the enactment of 
other explicit opposing laws, which has not happened.
117
 Others instead argue that there have 
been laws that clearly show an opposing will of the legislator.
118
 Some even doubt that the 
legislator wanted a continued influence of this provision in the beginning.
119
 In result the fact 
that the interest of the enterprise should play any role in a concept for the objective for 
corporate management is also disputed.
120
  
 
Nonetheless the interest of the enterprise remains one of the most important concepts in terms 
of management objectives in German corporate law. Most concepts at least refer to it and a 
good number actually makes the interest of the enterprise the overall guiding principle.
121
 
 
                                                 
112
 For example: Eckert, in: Wachter AktG, § 76, Para. 11; Seibt, in: Schmidt/Lutter AktG, § 76, Para. 12; 
Mühlbert, Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht 1997, 26 (2), 129, 142 f.; Schilling, Betriebs-
Berater 1997, 52 (8), 373, 379. 
113
 See Spindler, in: Münchner Komm AktG, § 76, Para. 69; also Spindler, Unternehmensinteresse als Leitlinie 
des Vorstandshandelns – Berücksichtigung von Arbeitnehmerinteressen und Shareholder Value, 9 (October 12
th
 
2008), URL: http://www.boeckler.de/pdf/mbf_gutachten_spindler_2008.pdf  (last visited on February 15
th
 2016); 
also Werder, Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht 1998, 27 (1), 69, 90. 
114
 Kuhner, Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht 2004, 33 (2), 244, 249; Mühlbert, Die 
Aktiengesellschaft 2009, 54 (21), 766, 772. 
115
 Mühlbert, Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht 1997, 26 (2), 129, 147-155. 
116
 See Spindler, in: Münchner Komm AktG, § 76, Para. 68, who deduces an obligation for management to 
consider multiple interests by using the social obligation of share property. 
117
 Hüffer, in: Hüffer AktG, § 76, Para. 30. 
118
 Mühlbert, Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht 1997, 26 (2), 129, 147 f., rejecting the idea 
that there is any continued legal validity of § 70 German Stock Corporation Act (1937). 
119
 Rittner, FS Ernst Gessler, 139, 142. 
120
 Mühlbert, Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht 1997, 26 (2), 129, 156. 
121
 Kuhner, Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht 2004, 33 (2), 244, 278. 
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3.1.2.3. Concluding remarks on the goals for management 
 
Due to a lack of room it is not possible to unfold the whole dispute between the different goal 
conceptions, weigh their arguments against each other and then try to choose the “right” goal. 
Nonetheless a roundup is necessary to draw basic conclusions for the overall question 
whether German corporate law is more share- or stakeholder oriented. 
 
The fundamental conflict of a German corporate law between a unified interest of the 
association of shareholders as the corporation and the multiple interests that meet in the 
enterprise, which the corporation operates, shows up clearly in these conceptions.
122
  
 
In spite of years of academic debate it still is not possible to give a final answer to what 
objectives the German management has. None of the listed goal conceptions is uncontested. 
What still can be concluded with relative certainty is that neither interest group can be totally 
left out of the consideration for decision-making.
123
 Whether or not there is any prioritization 
of interests and if yes, which interests have a priority edge is answered inconsistently.
124
 No 
one denies the need for corporate profitability.
125
 
 
The German Corporate Governance Codex can be a good indicator of the legal situation, even 
though it technically is not a binding law.
126
 And due to the fact that this codex shows the 
interest of the enterprise as the overall guiding principle it might point to a preponderance of a 
multi-interest concept, which in turn points to a strong stakeholder orientation in Germany.
127
 
What needs to be stressed at the end is that the German corporate management has very broad 
                                                 
122
 Mühlbert, Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht 1997, 26 (2), 129, 141-156, solving this 
problem in favor of the corporate purpose. 
123
 See OLG Frankfurt August 17
th
 2011, Die Aktiengesellschaft 2011, 56 (24), 918, 918; Spindler, in: Münchner 
Komm AktG, § 76, Para. 82 f.; Fleischer, in: Handb. VorstandR, § 1, Para. 31; Kuhner, Zeitschrift für Unterneh-
mens- und Gesellschaftsrecht 2004, 33 (2), 244, 278; Kort, Die Aktiengesellschaft 2012, 57 (17), 605, 609. 
124
 Werder, Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht 1998, 27 (1), 69, 79 and 89 f., in favor of 
shareholder interests and also concluding that the objective should be competitiveness on different fronts; similar 
Spindler, Unternehmensinteresse als Leitlinie des Vorstandshandelns – Berücksichtigung von 
Arbeitnehmerinteressen und Shareholder Value, 14 f. (October 12
th
 2008), URL: 
http://www.boeckler.de/pdf/mbf_gutachten_spindler_2008.pdf  (last visited on February 15
th
 2016); Kort, Die 
Aktiengesellschaft 2012, 57 (17), 605, 606-610, tends to no priorization of any interest, or if anything a 
priorization of stakeholder interests; also Müller, FS Johannes Semler, 195, 209; clearly seeing the pursuit of the 
interest of the enterprise as the main goal is Baums, American Journal of Comparative Law 2005, 53 (1), 31, 32. 
125
 Mertens, in: Kölner Komm AktG, § 76, Para. 22; Schilling, Betriebs-Berater 1997, 52 (8), 373, 377. 
126
 Mühlbert, Die Aktiengesellschaft 2009, 54 (21), 766, 771, stating that it only shows the comission’s 
understanding of the legal situation; Mathieu, Brooklyn Journal of International Law 2013, 38 (2), 579, 607, says 
the codex sets the corporate governance tone in Germany. 
127
 Ringleb, in: DCGK, Para. 562 and 565. 
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discretion in how to manage the corporation and the enterprise also in terms of overall 
objectives.
128
  
 
At the same time the question of an overall orientation of the laws regarding management is 
of little practical impact.
129
 This is on the one hand due to the fact that the interests and thus 
also the responsibility of the management to consider them have a relation of practical 
concordance,
130
 which means that long term all interests need to be considered to some degree 
to get the best result for all in the end. And on the other hand no court has ever rejected any 
management decisions, because of over- or under-considering the interest of share- or 
stakeholders.
131
 It is also not likely that this ever will happen, since courts are not meant to 
make those types of (business) decisions.
132
 In fact that is what a management is there for, i.e. 
to decide the overall business direction of the company. And if there is no overall binding law 
that explicitly obliges management to follow a share- or stakeholder orientation,
133
 then it is 
only right to give management a very broad discretion in terms of decision-making.  
 
3.2.2. Social conduct of management 
 
Up next is the question if management is allowed to act in (purely) social interest and if it is  
where the limits to such conduct are. A duty for purely social conduct of management can 
only exist in cases of explicit statutory provisions.
134
  
 
The social conduct of management, which is also discussed under the Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) topic or terminology, gained more and more popularity and relevance in 
the last years, due to an increased usage and presence in the media of such behavior.
135
 So did 
the question about the legitimacy and limits of such social conduct. Thus the most important 
justifications for social behavior of management will now be examined. 
 
                                                 
128
 Again Kuhner, Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht 2004, 33 (2), 244, 271. 
129
 Fleischer, in: Handb. VorstandR, § 1, Para. 35. 
130
 Mertens, in: Kölner Komm AktG, § 76, Para. 19. 
131
 Kuhner, Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht 2004, 33 (2), 244, 271. 
132
 Regarding the problem of legal control of business decisions see also Brinkmann, Unternehmensinteresse und 
Unternehmensrechtsstruktur, 303. 
133
 Also in favor of a clear regulation Spindler, Unternehmensinteresse als Leitlinie des Vorstandshandelns – 
Berücksichtigung von Arbeitnehmerinteressen und Shareholder Value, 20-22 (October 12
th
 2008), URL: 
http://www.boeckler.de/pdf/mbf_gutachten_spindler_2008.pdf  (last visited on February 15
th
 2016) 
134
 Langenbucher, Aktien- u. KapitalmarktR, § 1, Para. 15a; similar Hefermehl, AktG, § 76, Para. 21. 
135
 Mühlbert, Die Aktiengesellschaft 2009, 54 (21), 766, 766 f.. 
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3.2.2.1. Basic problem 
 
The basic problem is that management is using money of the corporation for a type of activity 
that usually does not or only indirectly aim at profitability. Because of that, such activities 
need further justification.  
 
If any social actions promise profits there really is no debate, as long as it does not violate any 
other rules. The so-called business case for CSR
136
 will for that reason not be further explored 
since it does not need any further justification than its profitability and can in result not 
deliver any additional information regarding an overall share- or stakeholder orientation. A 
similar situation exists if the articles of incorporation specify the corporate purpose in that 
way.
137
 Then management obviously is obliged to consider this in their decision-making. 
 
3.2.2.2. Responsibility of a good corporate citizen? 
 
A first way to justify social activities of corporation or rather its management evolves from 
the status of the corporation as a legal entity. The idea is that like any other good citizen with 
rights, corporations also have a responsibility towards society.
138
 So they need to be allowed 
to act socially responsible, ergo so must be the management.
139
 
 
The issue with this justification is mainly that the analogy between the corporation and the 
responsible citizen is misleading. Corporations only exist and only are legal entities to enable 
them to function as a vehicle for conducting business. So the purpose usually is business and 
not social conduct.
140
 And if it is social conduct in exceptional cases, this will need to be put 
down in the articles of incorporation anyways, which eliminates the need for justification. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
136
 Schreck, in: Schneider/Schmidpeter (Publ.), Corporate Social Responsiblity, 67, 67. 
137
 Mühlbert, Die Aktiengesellschaft 2009, 54 (21), 766, 772. 
138
 Fleischer, Die Aktiengesellschaft 2001, 46 (4), 171, 174, explaining that thought, even though denying it as a 
justification for social conduct of management finally. 
139
 Mühlbert, Die Aktiengesellschaft 2009, 54 (21), 766, 769, in the end also rejecting this justification. 
140
 Id. 
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3.2.2.3. Article 14 Para. 2 German Constitution 
 
The next line of justification is based on article 14 Para. 2 of the German Constitution.
141
 
Because (share-)property is also supposed to serve the public good,
142
 the idea is that a 
corporation needs at least be able to, if not is required to, act socially responsible.
143
 
 
There are a couple of problems with this idea of justification for social conduct of 
management. The issue with article 14 Para. 2 is that is does not contain any instructions to 
non-state actors but rather an instruction to the legislator to regulate.
144
 In general the German 
Constitution does not give any instructions in terms of an overall economic system
145
 and can 
thus never be used to justify any economic decision of the management
146
. So a possible 
justification would have to derive from any laws set by the legislator and not from the article 
itself.  
 
3.2.2.4. Management’s discretion 
 
A way to actually justify social conduct of management is the managerial discretion.
147
  
In general the German management has broad discretion how to manage the corporation and 
the enterprise.
148
 That also goes for managerial social conduct.
149
 So management is allowed 
to act socially responsible in the borders that § 93 Para. 1 Sent. 2 German Stock Corporation 
Act sets.
150
 Social conduct can even be allowed if there are no direct profits to hope for.
151
  
 
The problem remains control of this, due to the fact that actual cause-effect relationships are 
hard to judge in the case of social conduct. § 93 forbids actions that are detrimental to the 
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benefit of the company. But usually management will be able to justify social conduct in 
some way, even if it is just by saying the social esteem will be raised.
152
 As a result there is no 
clear line
153
 and whether or not a social action is justified needs to be examined from case to 
case
154
. Parameter for such an examination is the situation of the corporation in the broadest 
sense.
155
 This includes the size of the corporation, its financial situation and so on. 
 
At the end of the day it can be concluded that social conduct of management can be allowed 
depending on the individual case. Management has broad discretion in that regard but the 
limit is a business-related reasonableness.
156
  
 
3.3. Other indicators of a share- or stakeholder orientation in German law 
 
After examining the central indicator of an overall share- or stakeholder orientation of the  
German system, which is the legal situation of the corporate management, other laws will 
now also be checked for indications to such an orientation. 
 
3.3.1. Codetermination 
 
Another key indicator of an overall orientation is the German codetermination. This part will 
take a look at corporate codetermination and not operational codetermination that also exists 
in Germany and proceeds mainly in the form of works councils.
157
 
 
3.3.1.1. How does it work? 
 
German corporate codetermination is in large parts based on three acts. These are the German 
Codetermination Act
158
, which applies to companies with more than 2000 employees, the 
German One-Third Participation Act
159
, which applies to companies with less than 2000 but 
more than 500 employees and the German Coal, Iron and Steel Codetermination Act
160
. Even 
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though the procedure differs in detail, all of those acts require the respective corporations to 
let employees participate in a supervisory body.  
 
According to the Codetermination Act one half of the supervisory board needs to be worker 
representatives whereas the other half needs to be shareholder representatives, resulting in 
parity on the board. This equality only has one exception. § 27 Para. 2 of the act allows the 
shareholders to elect the chairman, if the two-thirds majority for this election required by § 27 
Para. 1 is not reached. And pursuant to § 29 Para. 2 the chairman has the decisive vote in the 
case of a tied vote in regular voting procedures. 
 
The One-Third Participation Act obviously gives the worker representatives one-third of the 
supervisory board’s seats, whereas the Coal, Iron and Steel Codetermination Act establishes 
parity on the board. 
 
3.3.1.2. What does it imply? 
 
Codetermination is a means to not only make the management consider stakeholder interests, 
but a rather direct way to make the worker interests felt in the decision-making process, due 
to the control function of the boards and the rights
161
 that come with it. Thus it is a procedural 
way to involve the worker’s interests in the consideration of the management
162
 instead of 
requiring the management to do so by some legal rule in the material law. 
 
In terms of an overall orientation the mere existence of such worker participation in a 
supervisory body shows a very clear stakeholder oriented system, even if the shareholders 
might have a tiny little bit more influence
163
 in big corporations (meaning those with more 
than 2000 employees). Considering the fact that workers are certainly the most important and 
influential stakeholders and that there basically is parity on the supervisory boards of big 
corporations the stakeholder philosophy could merely be stated more explicit.  
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Additionally the initial debate about codetermination in Germany, in particular about the 
constitutionality of the Codetermination act, is pretty much over these days.
164
 In its already 
mentioned decision regarding this constitutionality, the German Federal Constitutional Court 
stated social obligations of share property, due to the fact that this type of property has only 
limited influence on the private sphere of individuals.
165
 Considering this decision and the 
virtually ended debate, this also points to a broad acceptance not only of the codetermination 
but also of a however described stakeholder idea in general.
166
  
 
3.3.2. Executive compensation 
 
A quick look at executive compensation can give additional information about the orientation 
of the German system. 
 
The last major legislative change was the enactment of the Act on the appropriateness of the 
Management Board Remuneration in 2009.
167
 Objectives of this act were to improve the 
control of the supervisory board, increase transparency of the compensation and make 
corporate management pursue sustainable economic growth through specific compensation 
packages.
168
 
Today the key provision in terms of executive compensation in Germany is § 87 of the Stock 
Corporation Act. Together with part 4.2 of the Corporate Governance Codex it provides the 
regulatory framework for executive compensation in Germany.  
In very short they state the standards that the supervisory board has to consider in regard to 
setting executive compensation. So for example the compensation must be reasonable in 
different respects and aimed at sustainable development of the business.
169
 
 
The long-term sustainable growth goal and the prominent role of the supervisory board again 
point to a broader consideration of interests. In that regard executive compensation is even a 
very good example how codetermination ensures stakeholder participation, meaning through 
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extensive controlling rights of the supervisory board, which is partly filled with stakeholder 
(worker) representatives.  
 
Still a fair amount of the compensation can also be performance-based, variable compensation 
e.g. based on stock option programs. One reason for that obviously is to set incentives for the 
management, but it also clearly aligns management’s with shareholder’s interests.
170
 Thus the 
German executive compensation system also significantly considers shareholder interest.
171
 
 
3.3.3. Non-corporate law 
 
Outside of the corporate (and capital market) law basically no indications for a shareholder 
orientation can be found, whereas indications for a broader consideration of interest on the 
other hand can be found all over the German law, e.g. environmental protection regulation, 
over protective provisions in contract law, to a (arguably) worker friendly labor law.  
 
Due to limited room the specific provisions cannot be examined here, but it is still possible to 
identify a very stakeholder friendly overall picture. The German legal system does not only 
(maybe not even primarily) protect the stakeholders through corporate law regulation, but 
rather through other specific laws.
172
  
 
3.4. Share- or Stakeholder capitalism in Germany? 
 
The German (corporate) legal system can clearly not be described as shareholder centric. 
Neither is the management obliged to follow some kind of shareholder primacy rule, nor does 
the other legal framework ensure such primacy.  
 
What characterizes the German system is not any explicit rule that requires management to 
follow the strategic stakeholder approach in the sense of Freeman
173
,
174
 but rather other 
                                                 
170
 Ulmer, Archiv für die civilistische Praxis 2002, 202 (2), 143, 158 f.. 
171
 Höpner, Wer beherrscht die Unternehmen?, 55 
172
 See Busse v. Colbe, Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht 1997, 26 (2), 271, 289; Ulmer, 
Archiv für die civilistische Praxis 2002, 202 (2), 143, 158; also Fifka, UmweltWirtschaftsForum 2013, 21 (1), 
113, 117, who stresses the role of the legislator in Germanys stakeholder orientation. 
173
 Freeman, Strategic Management. 
174
 Spindler, Unternehmensinteresse als Leitlinie des Vorstandshandelns – Berücksichtigung von 
Arbeitnehmerinteressen und Shareholder Value, 20-22 (October 12
th
 2008), URL: 
http://www.boeckler.de/pdf/mbf_gutachten_spindler_2008.pdf  (last visited on February 15
th
 2016), sees this as 
 
 31 
regulation that makes sure the stakeholder interests are considered in some way, with 
codetermination being the clearest example for this. Management is only able to manage the 
corporation with consensus of the other influential stakeholder groups.
175
 I.e. regulation 
ensures that management cannot make substantial decision unilateral, so essentially power 
within the corporation is split up.
176
 Because other regulation plays such a huge role in the 
German stakeholder orientation, the system is also characterized by more state intervention.
177
 
In Germany it is broadly accepted that there is more to a corporation than just a legal entity 
owned by the shareholders, otherwise the concept of the interest of the enterprise would not 
be so omnipresent.
178
  
 
To conclude: the German legal system is not shareholder capitalistic. It must be described as 
stakeholder capitalistic, which does not mean that the managerial stakeholder theory 
characterizes the system, but rather that a literal multi-interest consideration does, which is 
mainly implemented by broad regulation ensuring the consideration of stakeholder interests. 
 
3.5. Outlook 
 
The most important trends that will most likely influence the orientation of the German 
system in the future are progressive internationalization of national capital markets,
 179
 the 
increased importance of such markets and institutional investors.  
Corporations are not primarily relying on bank financing anymore, but are rather making a 
move towards the (international) capital markets.
180
 Still the costs of capital are relatively 
high in Germany
181
 at least partially due to a lack of focus on creating shareholder value. 
Thus this increased competition for investors puts pressure on German corporations to meet 
their demands
182
 and focus more on the creation of shareholder value.
183
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Still the block holding has not changed much
184
 and there are also no major changes on the 
most important elements of the German stakeholder oriented system, such as codetermination, 
foreseeable in the near future. Therefore it is highly unlikely that the stakeholder orientation 
will be completely dropped any time soon. Nonetheless corporations, and in this regard this 
means the management and also all the stakeholders,
185
 will have to focus more on the 
shareholder needs to not fall behind in the competition for investors.
 186
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4. Shareholder v stakeholder capitalism in the US 
 
4.1. Introduction  
 
This Part discusses the American (corporate) legal system and it will shed more light on one 
of the most important debates in modern corporate governance; in particular, it will examine 
the debatable relationship between shareholders and stockholders’ interests in the corporate 
arena.  
 
Nowadays, there are many principles, concepts and terms shaping the management of 
organizations
187
. Examining the success of the companies and their governance, its 
interpretation is based on terms of profit like shareholder value and return on equity. These 
two parts constitute some of the most basic elements on which shareholder capitalism is based 
on. In addition, since the introduction of business ethics into the managerial scene, firms have 
set as their goals the satisfaction of the relationship between corporate social responsibility 
and shareholder value. Stemming from the latter goal though, stakeholder value approach 
makes its appearance giving rise to many questions regarding the priorities that management 
should set. That is the main reason why uncertainty in most of corporate managers’ decisions 
making exists making it even harder for them to decide. Despite their efforts to reach to a 
successful and viable decision, social sciences did not succeed to find an answer to the current 
uncertainty and the debate between shareholders and stakeholders’ capitalism is at the center 
of attention for many years now in many European counties as well as in the US.  
 
In particular, the analysis of the differences between shareholders and stakeholders’ rights in 
the USA helps to distinguish these two conflicting groups adopting these ideas. On the one 
hand, there are those who share normative doubts regarding shareholder value, and argue in 
favor of stakeholder value, according to which there should be a balance of stakeholder’s 
interests before any decision is made by the managers
188
. On the other hand, those who 
advocate in favor of shareholder value, argue that in a free market economy and 
entrepreneurship, shareholder value is the key for the successful growth of the firm. What 
really intriguers though academics’ attention is the potential impact of shareholder democracy 
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on corporate stakeholders such as creditors, the environment, the employees and the local 
communities
189
.  
 
In order to further understand USA’s position on the debate between shareholders and 
stakeholders’ interests, Part 4.2 of the paper first discusses the two approaches clarifying the 
important elements of these two theories. Then, Part 4.3. sheds more light on shareholders’ 
influence in practice, under the prism of directors’ behavior towards the stakeholders, aiming 
to clarify stakeholder’s notion under American corporate law. Later on, Part 4.4.initially 
discusses the managerial role of the board under American law in cases where a) a manager is 
insulated; b) there is a large ownership and control, setting the foundations for the 
understanding of directors’ constituencies taking a decision. Finally Part 4.5. discusses 
whether American law could accept stakeholders in its current corporations’ needs by 
examining codetermination matters as well as the newly introduced notion of “benefit 
corporations”.  
 
4.2. Development of shareholder’s and stakeholder’s approaches in the US    
 
4.2.1. Evolution of shareholder approach  
 
Aiming to the further development of the “a firm’s theory”, shareholders’ approach seems to 
be the predominant one in the USA. In particular, this approach is based initially on the 
concept of private property. As J. Locke argued
190
, shareholder approach constitutes the 
starting point of the socially defined property rights from where the theory of the firm is 
further developed. At the same time, under the prism of contract theory, Speckbacher
191
 
argues that shareholder approach makes its appearance under the assumption that a complete 
social contract does exist defining the responsibilities of the property rights.  That can be 
interpreted in a way according to which this approach prioritizes property rights’ owners and 
their willingness to make use of their assets. Owning the asset means that they can use it 
however they want; for instance, they could invest it in a firm. This is a common approach, 
where many people tend to decide to invest in a single firm known as a model of pooling 
private property. Under this approach, many owners decide to put their rights commonly in a 
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place of resources, everything being placed under central control, as it is described in the 
certificate of incorporation of the company
192
.   
 
Nevertheless, the theory of the firm brought to the surface several questions and especially the 
assumption inspired by private property rights which results in a number of implications. The 
most important one though aims at defining even more shareholders’ approach. Shareholder 
approach focuses more on the interaction and the relations created between the individual 
owners and the assets. However, as long as the assets are gathered in the firm, there are a 
couple of questions, such as: “under which principle should the assets be gathered?” and 
“who will be in total control of all the gathered assets?” The most dominant approach is that 
investors remain still the owners of the gathered assets having as a result their common 
ownership of these assets. Nothing really obliges under the private property rights the owners 
of these assets to restrict their decision making power and be guided only by the satisfaction 
of their personal interests. Thus, the firm tends to adopt specific tactics according to which, 
the assembled assets of the company are used (as it is specified by the law), in a way that the 
interests of its owners are truly satisfied, in other words, the interests of its shareholders
193
. 
 
4.2.1.1. Separation of ownership and effects on shareholders’ approach 
 
Nowadays though, many corporations are managed by professional managers hired by their 
owners and no longer by the owners themselves. As Berle and Means
194
 argued, a clear 
separation of ownership and control has started to establish itself. Since private property 
started to lose its prolonged acceptance throughout the years, new problems have started to 
concern corporations though. The interests of the corporations’ managers and the interests of 
their shareholders have started to diverge systematically. Starting from the analysis made by 
classical economists like Adam Smith
195
 to the ones made by modern scholars, this situation 
is identified as a principal agent problem
196
. Today, this can be justified under the prism of 
three systematic reasons: a) management is better informed whenever a successful business 
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strategy plan is implemented (hidden information problem); b) shareholders’ actions can be 
hidden (partly) by management (hidden action problem) and c) managers are given great 
flexibility in order to decide in a continuous modified environment, a very beneficial decision 
for the firm
197
. Under contract theory’s perspective, the agent-principal contract between the 
manager and the owners is not complete
198
. This openness of the contracts could result in 
shifting corporation’s focus on from satisfying the interests of its stakeholders to the interests 
of its shareholders. Thus, among shareholders’ goals could be to establish institutional 
arrangements based on which managers’ and their own interest harmonize.   
 
4.2.2. Evolution of stakeholder approach  
 
The role of stakeholders has always been a debatable topic in the US and especially whenever 
it was contrasted against shareholder’s interests. Bainbridge has been one of those who took a 
position against a more shareholders’ controlling position, arguing that is not absolutely 
essential to adopt a position where shareholders and stakeholders’ will be evaluated in a 
heterogeneous way. Similar decision making does not always lead to a better management
199
. 
Therefore, any expansion of shareholder influence over corporate decision-makers and 
decision making is not the optimal solution since that would affect the discretion of the board 
negatively.  
 
4.2.2.1. Directors accountable to everyone?  
 
There are also other voices criticizing shareholders’ tolerance to accept the importance of 
satisfying stakeholders’ interests first, arguing that this could encourage the directors to 
defend only a certain amount of shareholders’ or stakeholders’ interests instead of the whole 
class of shareholders
200
. Analyzing that situation it becomes clear that if directors are 
considered as being accountable to everyone, that would affect their managerial and 
supervisory efficiency
201
. In particular, directors would be distracted and instead of satisfying 
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shareholders’ wealth would end up defending stakeholders’ rights. However, to the extent that 
institutional investors are understood to use their influence in order to promote their own 
interests, sometimes even to the detriment of the beneficiaries, directors’ intervention is 
considered more than necessary. The economic value of the company is preserved and any 
depreciation or investors’ evaluation is avoided
202
. Therefore, someone can argue that when 
stakeholders’ interests are set at the centre of attention then instead of advancing company 
and shareholders’ profits, only the opposite to the desired results are achieved.  
 
4.2.2.2. Why should shareholders not be given absolute power?  
 
Towards the same direction, those being skeptical about shareholders’ absolute power, 
advocate in favor of a more stakeholders’ oriented behavior. However, they notice that both 
officers and directors are well equipped with the necessary legal tools to supervise the 
stakeholders efficiently under the current legal regime
203
. Hence, stakeholders’ position is 
encouraged to be supported by shareholders as well. Moreover, it is argued that in cases 
where management is insulated from shareholder control, that could be beneficial to 
shareholders ex ante. These decisions could encourage stakeholders to invest in the firm 
without having any second thoughts or fearing that shareholders will have company’s value 
transferred ex post
204
. Nevertheless, these opportunities can be only made available to the 
stakeholders, if shareholders are not in full control over the management. As Mitchell argues, 
the role of the board should be focusing on safeguarding corporation’s interests as a whole. 
Moreover, he notes that shareholders’ continuous dominant position in the management of the 
company could result in weakening management’s attention over the employers of the 
company and the rest of the stakeholders
205
. Briefly, if the company overpowers its 
shareholders’ profit oriented value that would have inevitably negative effects on 
stakeholders’ interests, ending up on hurting even the company’s future.    
 
4.2.2.3. Risks of giving excessive powers to investors 
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At the same time, other voices point out different risks and dangers whenever investors are 
given excessive power. Powerful investors tend to use their power in order to impose their 
interests either by directing company’s value toward opportunistic shareholders coalitions or 
by manipulating corporate constituencies or by aligning with managerial boards holding 
unfavorable position against non-shareholders
206
. In the 1990s many criticisms related to 
public pension funds were raised noting that many pension funds used their influence 
affecting negatively corporation’s and shareholders’ interests
207
. 
 
Overall, the management of a firm can be viewed as a trustee of all stakeholders that does not 
present opposed interests to those of the shareholders but is committed to balance the interests 
of the stakeholders in their decisions. Various reforms have been suggested by social 
institutions so as to accomplish some of the following goals: stakeholders’ participation in a 
company’s decision, promotion of dialogs among the stakeholders and the board, proposal of 
legislation that could strengthen stakeholders’ position in the company etc
208
. Nevertheless, 
shareholders’ primacy in the US is still the dominant notion.  
 
4.3. Shareholders primacy in the USA (the traditional view) 
 
4.3.1. Understanding of the norm of “shareholder primacy”  
 
Shareholders’ primacy’s concept is the notion that mainly describes corporate governance in 
the USA. The origin of the norm can be found back in the 1930’s and especially in the classic 
debate between Adolf Berle and Merrick Dodd. In particular, Berle’s
209
 argument was based 
on the conception of shareholders as owners of the corporation and thus, directors owned their 
fidelity to the shareholders of the company. The main purpose of this view is to show that the 
main goal of the corporation is the maximization of shareholders’ wealth. On the other hand, 
Merle’s
210
 argument was based on the idea that managers should expand their obligations to a 
wider set of beneficiaries. Overall, both Dodd and Berle, through their arguments, clarified 
managers’ obligations to their shareholders, separating them from those to the other 
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stakeholders, acknowledging at the same time the importance of considering other stakeholder 
interests as well
211
.  
 
4.3.1.1. Shareholder’s primacy: shareholders at the center of attention 
 
Initially though, based on Friedman’s theory, business’ only social responsibility is to 
increase its earnings as long as this is happening in a free and open competition, without any 
fraud and deception
212
. In its strongest form, the interpretation of shareholder’s supremacy on 
non-shareholders, and especially when focusing on social philanthropy or any other similar 
activities ends up in reducing shareholders’ profitability, a situation that cannot be considered 
as permissible. Such activities do not promote company’s ability to further increase its 
profitability and thus instead of maximizing shareholders’ earnings, they reduce them.  Under 
US perspective, these activities could only be considered as “big good investments” to the 
extent that in the long run they generate profit for the shareholders
213
.  
 
That does not mean though that stakeholders do not participate at all in a world where 
shareholder primacy is praised that much. Based on the law and economics argument, social 
welfare is better achieved whenever the managers of the corporation adopt a policy which 
holds them responsible only while trying to secure shareholders’ interests
214
. Towards the 
same direction someone could argue that by trying to satisfy shareholders’ interests and thus 
maximize their wealth that could result in a better satisfaction of the public. Not only the 
payment of the taxes is better achieved but also goods and services are better provided and 
more employees are hired
215
.  
 
By accepting shareholder influence, someone can argue that it is the direct or implicit 
influence that shareholders have on management’s decision making roles within legitimate 
business judgment. Shareholder influence though should not be misunderstood and perceived 
as shareholders’ protection against illicit activities. Whenever illicit actions are committed 
either by controlling shareholders or managers these constitute parts of a different subject and 
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are related more to agency problems in large corporations
216
. This distinction between the 
above mentioned directors’ decisions refers roughly to the division between the duties of care 
and duties of loyalty
217
 under US corporate law
218
 under which directors are subject to
219
.  
 
4.3.1.2. Shareholder’s primacy: the norm started to differentiate 
 
As it was discussed just above in the development of shareholder’s approach, directors and 
managers focus mainly on the idea that their goal is the maximization of shareholders 
value
220
. Nevertheless, shareholder primacy norm has really started to be questioned about its 
effectiveness. For instance, based on Gordon Smith’s approach the very well known argument 
of shareholder primacy used in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.
221
 and even in previous case law, 
that argument was not really used in order to clarify stakeholder-shareholders conflicts but its 
main use was to stabilize any conflicting interests between minority investors and controlling 
shareholders
222
.   
 
Most of the States in the USA have adopted constituency statutes based on which directors 
are allowed or required to take seriously into consideration employees’  interests, especially 
as a an answer to hostile takeovers
223
. In some states, and mainly in Delaware, takeover case 
law has introduced the idea that others’ interests and not only of the shareholders’ should be 
taken into account by the directors. In particular, customers, various creditors, employees and 
sometimes even the community in generally do have an impact on corporations’ 
constituencies
224
.  
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Briefly, as long as managers’ actions are not based on unlawful decisions, they can act and 
make decisions with great discretion on business related questions
225
. Top management is 
responsible for taking fundamental decisions of the firm as well as daily based ones, although 
for the most significant ones shareholders’ approval is strongly desired
226
.   
 
4.3.1.3. Implicit and explicit shareholder influence  
 
Within what is considered business judgment, shareholder influence can be produced in 
various ways. Nevertheless, there are two big categories under which shareholder influence 
can be interpreted. On the one hand there is the implicit shareholder influence and on the 
other, the explicit one. In particular, implicit shareholder influence is based on the 
institutional framework that may provoke managers to decide as if the business was directed 
by the shareholders. This could be the result of market driven mechanisms that implicitly 
push managers to satisfy shareholders’ interests
227
. Implicit influence is viewed as being more 
important in dispersed ownership. In this case, shareholder influence focuses more on 
analyzing those institutional factors that determine whether managers were incentivized or 
forced to satisfy shareholder interests within the allowances described by corporate law
228
. 
Explicit influence exists when the shareholders directly intervene into management. This kind 
of influence is strongly met not only by controlling shareholders but also by large 
shareholders who could eventually influence dramatically company’s business decisions.  
Concentrated ownership reflects mainly the ways that this influence is used.                                                                           
                                                                                          
4.3.2. “Stakeholders” interests in US corporate law 
 
As it has been discussed above, the interests of corporate stakeholders sometimes are aligned 
and sometimes not with those of the shareholders’. In many corporate decisions, someone 
could notice a significant conflict between the interests of various stakeholders and at the end 
a decision that would benefit certain shareholders would certainly harm the interests of the 
others.  
                                                 
225
 See Mark J. Roe, On Sacrificing Profits in the Public Interest, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND 
THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF FIRMS 88, 88, 90-91 
226
 Id. 
227
 See Dirk A. Zetzsche, An Ethical Theory of Corporate Governance History 23 (Ctr. for Bus. & Corp. Law, 
Working Paper No. 0026, 2007), at 17-21. 
228
 See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of law and the State in the Separation of 
Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (2001). 
 
 42 
Empirical research has showed that many existing corporate rules have already focused on 
giving an answer to intra-corporations’ structure conflicts. Starting from takeover regulation, 
to officer liability, scope of director, executive compensation and board structure, all these 
areas have pointed out a possible effect on wealth transfer, between stakeholders. 
Nevertheless, the decision to reach to a fair evaluation of these roles under the prism of 
shareholder wealth asks for normative justification. In particular, a justification that could 
really argue the importance of working in favor of shareholder interests to the detriment of 
other stakeholders
229
.  
 
A huge dilemma confronting management is its identification of the appropriate constituency 
to choose between either adopting anti-takeover devices or start evaluating a tender offer
230
. 
In a corporate control context, directors find themselves facing their traditional fiduciary duty 
to their shareholders to maximize the shareholder value
231
. Nevertheless, directors cannot 
focus only on satisfying shareholders’ interests since they have a duty to the corporation as a 
whole, in other words, to the “stakeholders”, considering that their lives are directly 
influenced by the corporation. 
 
The theory of “stakeholder” interests in a company is not a new concept for US case law. For 
instance, in Revlon
232
the Delaware Supreme Court held that in the context of a tender offer, a 
board of directors might be warranted to take into account the interests in addition to those of 
the stakeholder; in other words, the interests of the note holders
233
. Even though, someone 
would argue that the language in Revlon was dicta by the court and nothing else had ever 
been noted in another Delaware Supreme Court case, an investor was given the chance to file 
a certificate of incorporation now in Delaware which would adopt a “beneficial” purpose and 
the Secretary of State's Office would not deny that filing. Nevertheless, since Delaware never 
adopted a “constituency” statute, someone would very simply ask: “what duties would be 
owed to the creditors, the environment, the employees and the community?  
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Under common Delaware law, it would be clear that this certificate would not be able to 
create any fiduciary duties but only to the shareholders. The real question is whether the 
purpose clause has such a broad character in order to proceed in the creation of further 
beneficiary rights (third-party beneficiary rights) in the “constituencies” found therein. An 
additional issue would have been the actual application of the business judgment rule
234
 to the 
decisions made by Delaware directors, since the certificate has broadened the scope of 
stakeholders.   
 
4.4. Management of the company and directors’ constituencies    
 
4.4.1. Directors’ influence on decision making process 
 
Neither directors nor managers are obliged to satisfy the interests of employees and of the 
other stakeholders, since their interests most of the times do not coincide with these groups
235
. 
Nevertheless, supporters’ of production theory argued that it is directors’ obligation to satisfy 
any corporate constituents successfully as a trade in order to safeguard their jobs
236
. At the 
same time any social norms which are further enforced by legislation, manage to further 
persuade both managers and directors not to engage in self dealing but to strive for loyalty 
and fairness protecting company’s constituents
237
.  At this point someone would argue that 
directors often decide being driven by a narrow interpretation of the economical rational 
especially whenever they have to build relationships of trustworthiness with stakeholders 
wanting to enhance the common objectives of the corporate coalition
238
. 
 
However, the social norms argument does seem to be an ambiguous reality. Sometimes 
positions which would be in favor of a social norm for short term stockholder value could be 
found responsible for a corporate scandal. This is actually the case since there is not any 
                                                 
234
 The crucial delineation defining the duty of care is the business judgment rule (hereinafter “BJR”). Under this 
rule, directors are given enough flexibility in order to make all the daily decisions as long as: a) before they 
decide they gather all the necessary information, b) they act in good faith and c) they keep a distance from self-
interest decisions. According to section 102(b)(7) of  the Delaware General Corporation Law (hereinafter 
“DGCL”) firms are even allowed to preclude liability whenever the duty of care is violated; as a result most of 
the corporations in Delaware adopted this provision. 
235
 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675 (2007). at 909-11. 
236
 See Margaret Blair & Lynn Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999) 
at 315. 
237
 Id. at 315-16. 
238
 See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of the Corporate 
Board, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 427 (2001). at 438-41. 
 
 44 
uniformity regarding the quality of the social norms that prevail at the end
239
. Nevertheless, 
for some this could be only the result of the non compatibility of a team production and an 
implicit shareholder influence approach
240
. According to the results of recent studies, 
entrenched management has been related to lower shareholder wealth whereas takeovers are 
associated with lower in variables decreases in wages
241
. While antitakeover statutes seem to 
be related with higher payments
242
, takeover defenses tend to be associated with lower cost of 
debt; hence, creditors are found in an advantageous position
243
. Other recent studies have 
proven as well that worker satisfaction and enhanced corporate social performance are closely 
connected to managerial entrenchment
244
.  
 
Based on behavioral theory’s results, someone could argue that when managers are not under 
pressure, then their decisions do not really focus on maximizing profits. Their attention is 
attracted more by their willingness to determine the best payoff methods that the providers of 
equity would accept
245
. It is a general rule that outside shareholders cannot verify 
corporation’s profits. Thus, this information is attempted to be fully disclosed to the 
shareholders
246
. Since managers have a strong preference not to provoke their shareholders by 
choosing the non-disclosure of plant closings, that results in benefiting employees’ 
interests
247
.  
 
A strong preference for continuation of firm’s operations without any substantial 
modifications could also make indirectly reference to union competition and avoidance of job 
cuts. Under certain occasions though, during a hostile takeover for instance, top management 
and employees end up to be on the opposite sites
248
. One can argue though that by insulating 
the managers, the agency problem related to shareholders is exacerbated. Except from the 
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managers themselves, nobody else is benefited from illicit managerial self-dealing. Conducts 
like these are typically within the duty of loyalty. Moreover, another potential problem which 
makes its appearance quite often is the employees and managers’ insufficient effort. Thus, 
any efforts aiming at creating an optimal corporate governance regime are supposed to be 
viewed as an attempt of achieving the right balance between the minimization of any holdup 
costs and agency costs. 
 
4.4.2. Large ownership and control 
 
Many researchers have shown that large shareholders facilitate holdups of non shareholders 
constituencies
249
. On the other hand, others may argue, and especially in Europe, that in long-
term periods, specific investments agreed by managers or any implicit contractual 
relationships can be facilitated by big financial investors or by various other shareholder 
constituencies
250
.  
 
The argument that large shareholders can really contribute to the alleviation of holdup 
problems seems to be quite doubtful. At the same time, it is widely accepted that in control 
oriented financial markets, large shareholders tend to keep for a significant period of time 
their shares
251
, the fact that a large shareholder exist does not really facilitate any specific 
investment. Although, that would create the assumption that there is always a threat of hostile 
takeovers, however, that is not the case today in the USA. It is known that employees, 
stakeholders and managers are protected by hostile takeovers by big shareholders under 
concentrated ownership. Nevertheless, many would argue that there are two main reasons 
according to which a holdup occurs. First, financial benefits can be offered to large 
shareholders themselves. Second, large shareholders who do not show any interest in ex post 
opportunistic sales to third parties, even in cases where they not willing to keep stakeholders 
themselves waiting.  
  
Regarding managers, economic theory explains that specific investment is not encouraged in 
cases of concentrated ownership since managers only keep their place in the corporation at the 
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whim of the dominant coalition or shareholder. Burkart, Gromb & Panuzi explain the tradeoff 
that exists between managerial initiative, which is initiated by block holders, on the one hand 
and on the other hand, reduction of agency cost proposed by large shareholders, simply by 
monitoring it. It becomes obvious then that managerial initiative, viewed initially as directly 
invested, is not chosen ex ante by the managers, if they do not get any guarantee that they will 
be able to keep the control of the company ex post regardless the existence of a block 
holder
252
.    
 
The same reasoning goes to employees as well, where in case there is a controlling or a large 
shareholder, they cannot resist not to be part of a holdup
253
.  In order to further understand 
that position, someone should think of a controlling shareholder with absolute control of 
corporation’s business decisions and a fully entrenched director who is not subject to implicit 
or explicit shareholder influence, both having in mind to increase profits by threatening 
employees
254
.  
 
From what it was discussed above, the established manager’s interest may to some degree 
coincide with the interests of the employees. The same conditions may apply to the 
controlling shareholder of the corporation if that person truly has under his control the 
management of the firm. Nevertheless, although an established manager does have personal 
benefit from any existing holdup in the firm, the controlling shareholder is the one that is 
really benefited
255
. Therefore, someone could argue that a controlling shareholder would be 
more willing to expropriate non-shareholder constituencies rather than a non-controlling one. 
Most of the incentives as a result of the implicit shareholder influence manager’s incentives 
are different
256
.  
 
Moreover, the difficulty of selling in a firm publicly held a large share is one of the main 
reasons why specific investment may be facilitated by concentrated ownership
257
.Analyzing 
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shareholders’ behavior showing fear for holdup, the counterpart is a voluntary sale of control 
action to hostile takeover in a controlled corporation
258
. Contrary to what is happening in 
hostile takeovers, managers under concentrated ownership find themselves under a 
continuous control under dominant shareholders and thus sales are unlikely to change
259
. 
Nevertheless, matters concerning specific investment, stakeholders’ incentives may be 
influenced
260
.  Overall, the protection of stakeholders is examined under the prism on whether 
the dominant shareholder is: a) not made by a third party, a lucrative offer and b) both 
unwilling and unable to proceed in the expropriation of non-shareholder constituencies on its 
own. For the first condition to be satisfied, it is necessary for the controlling shareholder to 
focus on non-pecuniary private benefits
261
.  
 
It is the identity of the shareholder though that determines whether non-pecuniary benefits 
will appear or not. In particular, there are three occasions where non-pecuniary benefits could 
rise: a) the controlling shareholder may be a government entity aiming at saving taxpayers’ 
money; b) in family ownerships. Although that is not met very often in the US, it is a general 
phenomenon in smaller European countries
262
. That affects the entrepreneurial skills of the 
firm since the interest is lost, leading to the sale of the firm under very disadvantageous 
prices;
263
 and finally c) in cases where controlling shareholders agree to enter in a transaction 
with not very favorable terms. That affects though minority shareholders’ interests, and thus 
under corporate law that tactic has started to eclipse more and more
264
. 
 
Concentrated ownership cannot be seen as a commitment mechanism which facilitates 
stakeholders’ specific investments. Even in cases where a delay is not considered as potential 
threat, it could provoke a deterrent against specific investment as it would be the case of a 
hostile takeover. Thus, for very concentrated capital does not even exist any doubt why labor 
involvement (as stakeholders) should be considered as important constituencies. \ 
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4.4.3. Director’s constituencies  
 
Debates over constituency directors in the USA have been at the center of American corporate 
law from the 1970’s. In particular, there were some proposals about having a board member 
to represent labor or environmental interests on the board. These proposals though did not 
really flourish in the US since existing corporate governance structures never let them enough 
space to grow
265
.  
 
A different concept though has arisen more recently with hedge fund representatives on 
boards. Compared to those representatives who would defend labor or environmental interests 
on the board, hedge funds representatives tend to be more “aggressive” aiming more at 
satisfying short-term profit goals. That position has provoked boards’ attention, in particular 
in cases where the majority of the board does not seem willing to obey to the minority’s 
interests (hedge funds’ representatives
266
) leading to internal conflicts of interests harming 
sometimes even for the existence of the corporation itself. Nevertheless, someone would 
argue that in both cases, constituency directors challenge the theme about whether the board 
should consider disparate interests or a single goal and, relatedly, the question which is 
eventually born is: “how the board should be structured to serve that objective?”
267
 
 
From a theoretical point of view, corporate law’s perspective approach seems to contradict 
with all the possible desirable constituency interest representation of the board. Arguments 
made in favor of a more non-uniform positon tend to be more convincing and persuasive than 
those that defend a more uniform duties position.  
 
Nevertheless, limitations that may be imposed by corporate law are not always taken into 
consideration. In other words, even in cases where it is given specific preference to the 
standard duty standard, that does not affect the fairness. But, why is that? What is really 
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questioned at this point, is it really the reality of the regulated situation or there is something 
else? Corporate law finds itself facing a dual reality: the pragmatic nature of the corporate 
actors who are willing to compromise in the constraints they are asked to undertake in order 
to help the company to evolve and develop. Moreover, towards the same direction, corporate 
directors do not hesitate to select rules enforcing them in a more diligent way than others 
would. At this point, the duty of confidentiality, found to be on the legal books in a quite strict 
format, makes clear that its transformation from a mandatory duty for directors into a default 
rule, would be widely accepted since that would facilitate active interactions between firms 
and venture capitalists when they want to invest
268
.   
 
Furthermore, most of the disagreements and the conflicts of interest that may rise between all 
the various constituencies that are represented by the different directors are not likely to be 
examined thoroughly by the courts. For instance, the shareholder primacy rule (as it has been 
discussed before) is not considered to be vigorously enforced all the time. Robert Clark 
argues in the Dodge v. Ford case that Ford’s mistake was not his decision itself to act as he 
did but to have his decision based on social motivation.
269
 Most decisions which are 
redistributed among workers and shareholders, such as whether a factory will be closed, or 
what are the benefits provided to the employees of the corporation, or how a bargain is going 
to be performed with the union, are all most of the types protected by the business judgement 
rule
270
. Someone could argue the same, in case where there is a conflict of interest between 
creditors and shareholders, trying to specify what the appropriate risk is for the company (in 
general, higher risk is redistributed to the shareholders from the creditors) .  
 
Todd Henderson and Douglas Baird argue that the board has the power to take decisions that 
can benefit the creditors to the detriment of the shareholders, under the condition that this 
decision is based on facts, well thought, decided in good faith, and without conflicting any of 
the majority of the directors’ personal interests
271
. However, it becomes more difficult to 
determine these situations in cases where there is a conflict of interest between not different 
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directors but between different groups of shareholders. For instance, under Delaware law, a 
director who is representing a venture capital, in a transaction with that shareholder, would 
not be considered as disinterested by the courts. That is actually the reason why a decision on 
a self-dealing transaction where this director would participate, he would be subject to entire 
fairness review
272
. In case where a transaction would confer a benefit to the sponsoring 
shareholders, the nominee directors do not even find themselves capable of promoting their 
sponsor’s interests. At the same time, any corporate goal that asks from directors to promote 
“the interest of the corporation” or setting it to a broader sense to its corporate constituencies, 
that would make courts’ enforceability of any specific action even more difficult
273
.  
 
The fact that there is any not efficient enforcement of a corporate objective, that gives 
adequate flexibility to the decision-making process to be considered “flexibly” by directors. 
The way that directors are appointed and nominated determines the outcome of board 
deliberations. Considering that an enforceable and clear objective is not provided by corporate 
law, someone can reach to the conclusion that the “interest of the corporation” can be more 
interpreted procedurally than substantively. In other words, those duties which are imposed to 
directors stemming from corporate objectives tend to be outcome of the process of board 
deliberation
274
. Thus, directors end up to formulate the corporate objective through their 
deliberations, a way which helps them to define the duty of loyalty
275
.  
 
Inspired by the German supervisory board having members participating efficiently from the 
labor and capital benches
276
, that understanding shows that the interest of the corporation 
becomes suitable for all the various situations of “nominee” and “constituency” directors. 
Nevertheless, the interest of the corporation defined here is primarily determined by board 
deliberation. By permitting a certain type of director on the board, the purpose is to integrate 
the interests related to its constituency into the specification of corporate policies. Apparently, 
if a board of directors is composed of different directors, that will develop a thoroughly 
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different“interest of the corporation” in the relevant case always taking into account the 
constituencies represented at this point.  
 
4.5. Stakeholders’ interests at the center of attention under US law?  
 
4.5.1. Co-determination in the US 
 
The US has been one of the countries (compared to what can be viewed in Europe)
277
 that 
does not have much experience with employee representation on corporate boards except 
from the case where there is a small employee owned company
278
. Only a few boards that 
have been elected would have as their goal to satisfy public’s or consumers’ interests
279
. 
These board members though, despite their flexibility, always have to answer back to the 
shareholders while not having any particular defined constituency
280
. In the US the 
participation of an employee in the board has not been regarded as an advantageous position 
for the benefits of the corporation, since the shareholder primacy rests dominant dealing with 
some apparent problems that could rise otherwise.  
 
In the employee side apparent problems to codetermination do not constitute real problems. 
Even though employees’ groups are distinguished for their divergence, constituencies are 
defined and election districts are specified representing the most important interests and 
categories. In addition despite the possible disagreements that may arise in the areas of 
collective bargaining and codetermination, in practice these two conditions can coexist and 
produce very significant result to the operations of the firm. It has been proven actually that 
codetermination can really contribute to improvement and strengthening of collective 
bargaining
281
. 
 
Nevertheless, the tough problems are the less distinctive ones. For instance, how for those 
employees that here is not any representation in collective bargaining their interests are 
represented on the board? Since these groups do not have any particular structure that means 
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that their representation in the election process is really limited. Codetermination does require 
the active participation of the implicated members of the firm in order to offer to those 
employees that are not part of any collective agreements organizational functions beyond 
electing powers only. These functions should be reflected both in the employees’ resources 
and functions. Opportunities like these can be offered satisfying various purposes which 
should not be only restricted in the context of codetermination
282
.  
 
Among the tough problems, the problem of conflict of interest between the employee’s 
representatives on the board is among the most distinguished ones. Nevertheless, its 
seriousness cannot be really compared to the differences between the interests of the outside 
and the inside directors of the company. In this case, the interests of the inside directors, who 
are highly paid executives and take the business decisions can be much more influential
283
.   
 
Towards the same direction, another problem that can be indentified is the problem of 
confidentiality. Employee directors are supposed to have full access to information regarding 
the management and the strategical decisions of the company. However, someone could argue 
that this would not be achieved very easily since their interests rarely coincide with the 
interests of the managing directors. On the other hand, there are voices arguing that with 
modest reinforcing measures this gap could be filled. Nevertheless, under US law, there is not 
any particular provision that could really safeguard corporation’s interests (or in other words, 
shareholders’ rights) while at the same time provide the same satisfaction to its stakeholders 
(in our case the employees) the same satisfaction
284
.  
 
Despite the above mentioned dominant opinion, codetermination could be used as a tool, 
benefiting board of directors’ position no matter its significant implications on corporation’s 
concept. For some, codetermination could be seen as an answer to narrow down shareholders’ 
primacy. But would the US be ever ready to change its well established corporate decisional 
structure towards such a direction? That is a hard answer to be given, however, 
codetermination could be seen as a common shelter for both employees and shareholders’ 
interests
285
. 
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One very significant issue that needs to be avoided though is the confrontation between 
frustrating codetermination and attitude of collective bargaining. To this matter, there is not 
any specific answer yet in the USA; however, what could be really done is the establishment 
of a specific procedure and form for codetermination in the country. At the same time the 
advancement of safeguards is more than necessary aiming at limiting the consequences of any 
conflict while ensuring for those who participate any opportunities. At this point, someone 
could argue that codetermination can only perform its function whenever parties agree to 
recognize the existence of common interests that need to be satisfied. However, in cases 
where parties treat each other as adversaries, codetermination can still provide to the parties 
the chance to discuss their differences and reach to mutually beneficial agreements
286
. For 
those who are in favor of introducing codetermination in the US, they argue that no further 
modifications are required for the further establishment of that concept since it is built upon 
the premise that the management of the company which is based on the board of directors
287
.  
 
Despite all the efforts made to start consider stakeholders’ interests by proposals made like 
using codetermination as part of management’s policy, there still issues that need to be 
covered so as to change the whole shareholders’ satisfaction philosophy.    
 
4.5.2. Benefit corporations 
 
Some of the most important questions that corporations need to answer nowadays focus really 
on the issue: Why shouldn’t be promoted the change of nature of some corporations in order 
to ask from the directly to address all stakeholders’ interests? 
 
Although in the US stakeholders’ interests are not considered by regulation, during the last 
years a couple of states have decided to supplement their corporation law. Nowadays, many 
states have included in their law provisions which consider this matter. In particular, their 
laws accommodate now benefit corporations (hereinafter, “B corporations”). These entities 
are non-profit and are required to take into account stakeholders’ interests and aim at 
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satisfying specific target(s) that yield benefits for the public based on their constituent 
documentation (for example, articles of incorporation)
288
.  
 
Jurisdictions in the USA from November 2013 made their first steps in order to include 
benefit corporation law in their state. The statute which has been recently enacted in Delaware 
State gives another perspective in terms of treating stakeholders. Delaware defines “public 
benefit” as “a positive effect (or reduction of negative effects) on one or more categories of 
persons, entities, communities or interests (other than stockholders in their capacities as 
stockholders)
289
”. In its certificate of incorporation a Delaware B corporation is obliged to 
identify at least one of the benefits that it intends to promote.  
 
According to the requirements of Delaware law, a Delaware B corporation demands from its 
directors to manage the affairs and the business of the company in a sustainable and 
responsible way, pursuing always to achieve a balance between the following: a) 
stockholders’ pecuniary interests, b) those interests that are influenced due to the company’s 
conduct (those of the stakeholders) and c) those public benefits that have been found in the 
corporation’s articles of incorporation
290
.  
 
The corporation expects from its directors to satisfy their fiduciary duties while at the same 
time the new Delaware law is enacted in order to protect directors from any potential lawsuits 
by those investors who would argue that directors do not maximize shareholder value while 
pursuing public benefits
291
. Nevertheless, that law offers directors latitude that exceeds 
“business judgment rule’s” protection which already protects quite efficiently directors from 
shareholder lawsuits
292
.  
 
But are there any concerns about B corporations? At this point, someone would argue that 
since a Delaware B corporation is intended to balance stakeholder’s interests, only those who 
hold bigger blocks of stocks would be able to sue so as to enforce directors’ duties. Thus, by 
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enacting this law, management and directors are allowed to be less responsive to criticism and 
complacent, considering their accountability to stakeholders
293
.  
 
Moreover, another issue that could arise with a B corporation concerns its ability to attract 
equity capital. Since Corporation B is viewed more as an investment that would attract to 
“socially responsible” investors, others may have been less willing to invest expecting any 
returns as an exchange for offering some good public chances. 
 
4.6. Conclusion 
 
To conclude, American corporate directors and officers are known to have enjoyed broad 
discretion so as to consider stakeholder interests. The notion of shareholder primacy though 
examined under the prism of some of Delaware Court’ decisions, still remains the dominant 
view, overshadowing stakeholders’ interests in many occasions.  
 
Nevertheless, that has led empowered shareholders to satisfy their own interests and under 
certain conditions achieve that to the detriment of the stakeholders. So far, it has been very 
common for the board of directors to adopt a behavior which was aiming solely to the 
maximization of shareholder value. Powerful or controlled shareholders may force 
management to swift value to certain shareholders from other shareholders but this has started 
not to be the optimal option. Some argue in favor of stakeholders’ interests but this still 
remains the voice of the minority. Moving a little bit further, directors’ constituencies have 
started to be examined in more depth, trying to satisfy the goals of the corporation as a whole 
this time.  
 
Towards a pro-stakeholder appreciation and of their interests under US corporate law, both 
the notion of codetermination as well as of the newly enacted B-Corporation seem to bring 
promising “innovations” under US and on stakeholders’ interests in general. 
 
However, nobody can argue that the optimal solution for US would be a total rejection of its 
existing “beliefs”; the answer could be surely a determined opening to stakeholders’ interests 
keeping at the same time the satisfaction of shareholder value to its maximum.  
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5. Comparative Section
294
 
 
5.1. Shareholder Versus Stakeholder approach 
 
This section will take a closer look at problems and possible advantages that both approaches 
to corporate governance have in general or compared to the other. It is obviously very hard to 
do such an evaluation since both approaches have a lot of sub-theories and different 
accentuations as mentioned above. Therefore, this look at issues of the approaches will be 
limited to the usual, very general points of criticism which are applicable to overarching 
shareholder and stakeholder capitalism as defined in sections 2.1. and 2.2. 
 
One apparent issue that both approaches have likewise is that they could overpower one party 
if the act of balancing goes wrong. Hence if one party gets more power, than actually 
necessary for the benefit of the corporation it would then result in disadvantages like already 
mentioned in section 2.3. 
 
In case of the shareholder approach it is possible that shareholders are so powerful that they 
take advantage of the other corporate units in “hold-up”-situations. For the stakeholder 
approach the problem could be that managers who get a lot of discretion to also consider 
stakeholder interests do not have enough control mechanisms whereby they can act in self-
interest. 
 
5.1.1. Stakeholder approach: issues & advantages  
 
Following up on this issue, one argument regularly brought up against the stakeholder 
approach is that it has no clear objective.
295
 The approach has the problem that it is vague to a 
certain degree, due to not specifically stating how to approach the stakeholder relations and 
therefore the business as a whole.
296
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Multiple interests can and have to be taken into account. By that means the decision makers 
are accountable to every stakeholder, which finally leaves them with no accountability at 
all.
297
 Again the result is a threat of managerial self-dealings to the detriment of the 
corporation and all corporate units, shareholders included, other than the managers 
themselves. 
 
Another famous problem with the stakeholder approach is the so-called “Stakeholder 
Paradox” found by Goodpaster. The paradox evolves from the fiduciary duties the managers 
have in relation to the shareholders. From his understanding of the stakeholder approach the 
management is supposed to have a multi-fiduciary position, meaning that managers have 
fiduciary duties to all the stakeholders of the corporation.
298
 And since a fiduciary duty 
requires one party to act solely in the interest of another it cannot work if the fiduciary has 
those types of duties to more than one party.
299
 
 
The issue nearly always coming up when it comes to evaluating stakeholder theory is that it 
does not account for business considerations and realities enough
300
 or rather that there is no 
room for social considerations in business decisions
301
. Those points of criticism are insofar 
not valid that they have an incomplete if not wrong understanding of the stakeholder 
approach. The stakeholder approach does have a goal: maximum value creation for the 
corporation as a whole.
302
 It also is not necessarily the idea of the stakeholder approach to 
take ethical and social considerations into account
303
 especially if they run against all 
economic reasoning because it still is a business approach. 
 
Additionally the argument of too much freedom and discretion for managers does not work. 
That is because it is not in line with the stakeholder approach to give the managers so much 
power that they become unaccountable or can deal in their own interest. The idea of the 
stakeholder theory is to give managers as much room in decision-making, as they need to be 
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able to take other interests than those of the shareholders into consideration, but not more. 
Anything else is not the stakeholder approach and cannot be used to criticize it as a result. The 
“Stakeholder Paradox” is also not really a problem since stakeholder theory does not adopt 
the fiduciary duty model of the classic shareholder approach.
304
  In conclusion basically no 
point of critic is sweeping because the stakeholder theory can counter them with different 
understandings of the underlying ideas. Still the actual problem of ambiguity of the objective 
and multi-interest considerations remains. 
 
5.1.2. Shareholder approach: issues & advantages 
 
The first and easiest point of criticism concerning the shareholder approach is that it is to 
narrow. The argument is that due to its focus on creating shareholder value it is not able to 
consider the relationships with other corporate groups appropriately.
305
 So the idea is that a 
good governed corporation or corporate governance in general must have a broader scope 
than just the principal-agent-relationship
306
 (which then in turn is one of the most important 
arguments for the stakeholder approach). The other substantial argument against the 
shareholder approach is that it is said to favor „short-termism“.
307
 Since shareholders have a 
good amount of power in a corporation and are even capable of getting managers fired, the 
management has a very strong incentive to meet the demands and interests of shareholders.
308
 
But most long-term strategies do not influence the share price immediately or directly.
309
 In 
addition the shareholders do not have the same information the management has and therefore 
lack the knowledge and in a lot of cases also the skill to put a corporate decision into (long-
term) perspective.
310
 That is why incomprehension and resentment can grow towards the 
management in case of making long-term decisions. As a result it is easier and safer for the 
management to take the route of quick, apparent but also of possibly more risky decisions in 
hope to create easy gains for the shareholders.
311
  
 
So the argument in short is that corporate management is forced into taking short-term gains 
in share value over the long-term welfare of the corporation and potentially even society as a 
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whole. Similar to some of the points of criticism before, the argument that the shareholder 
approach is too narrow is based on a bit of a misunderstanding. The idea of the shareholder 
approach is not to ignore all corporate units except for the shareholders but instead to make 
interests of the shareholders and therefore an increase in the share value the highest priority. 
The interests of other groups can and even have to be respected and considered but only to 
foster the actual objective of the corporation, meaning the maximum share value.
312
 So the 
shareholder approach is indeed considering all corporate relations but decides to make the 
meeting of the demands of shareholders the corporate objective and can in result not really be 
criticized as too narrow.  
 
The other argument is a legit concern for the shareholder approach. The threat of favoring 
short-termism and harming corporate welfare long-term is a real thing.
313
 In spite of that there 
are effective ways to prohibit this short-term decision-making. As mentioned above one 
reason for this short-termism is the lack of information available for shareholders about 
corporate decision making. Thus one way to eliminate incentives for short-termism is 
eliminating information deficiencies by providing detailed and understandable information 
about the reasoning behind the (long-term) decisions to shareholders.
314
 
 
The other means to prohibit short-termism by managers is to give them stronger incentives to 
create long-term value for the corporation. A way to do this is by making part of their 
compensation performance-based and long-term oriented.
315
  
 
This together with a functioning information policy can create enough incentives for 
managers to seek long-term value while also ensuring support from the shareholders for the 
managerial decisions. Like it was the case for the stakeholder approach, there is also not one 
overwhelming reason against the shareholder approach. 
 
5.1.3. Conclusion of the evaluation 
 
It has become apparent that it is difficult to evaluate the two approaches. Both approaches 
have a right to exist. None of the arguments is so convincing that they could take away the 
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foundation of the approach. Just as little as one of the approaches could be called superior. 
Applied the right way share- and stakeholder capitalism both are conclusive concepts and it 
mainly comes down to the local realities to decide why approach suits the economy best.
316
 
 
5.2. Codetermination in the US and in Germany 
 
This part will now take a comparative look on the legal situation of codetermination in both 
countries and try to draw conclusions in regard to an overall orientation. 
 
5.2.1. Legal situation 
 
As shown above the German corporate governance system is mainly characterized by 
codetermination. Germany does not have an explicit guideline that obliges the management 
board to manage the corporation in a stakeholder friendly direction, but rather a system of 
codetermination of the supervisory board that ensures the consideration of stakeholder (more 
precisely worker) interests in everyday business.
317
 The most important German regulation in 
that regard is the Codetermination act, which basically requires parity of worker and 
shareholder representatives on corporate boards. 
 
The US system can be said to work the other way around. A very stakeholder considerate 
legal framework is not existent there. The key corporate organ in the US that is able to 
consider stakeholder interest significantly is the management. 
 
Corporate law in the US is far away from such a system of parity on corporate boards. In fact 
there basically is no mandatory (stakeholder) codetermination on US boards at all. Even 
though a codetermination system has been debated, the US never really came close to 
enacting one
318
. 
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5.2.2. Reasons for this difference 
 
This difference is at least partly due to some of the different local circumstances in the US 
and Germany. For starters codetermination would only make sense if federal law requires 
it.
319
 But in contrast to Germany, the US does not have a unified federal corporate law system. 
Thus the enactment of something as influential and changing as codetermination would 
constitute a major problem in terms of practical implementation.  
 
Another important difference is the general situation of labor in the US and in Germany. The 
major means to represent the interests of workers in the corporation is collective 
bargaining.
320
 In Germany collective agreements are also existent, but are in contrast to the 
US not the only and arguably not even the main way to represent workers interests. 
 
Germany has works councils and obviously codetermination to ensure consideration of 
worker interests in the corporation. Still all of those measures have slightly different goals. 
Whereas collective agreements are using the combined power of all the workers in the union 
to improve the working situation of a whole industry, both codetermination and the system of 
work councils
321
 is aimed at improving the situation of workers in the specific corporation. 
The later is for the most part just non-existent in the US. 
 
One possible reason for this is that there simply is less need for such worker protection on the 
corporate side. This could be based on the weaker, because more dispersed, shareholder 
influence in the US that was mentioned earlier. In Germany where block holding was 
traditionally more prevalent shareholders had and might still have a stronger influence and 
therefore the hold-up threat for workers and other shareholders is bigger.
322
 
 
Still a good amount of workers in the US are not covered by collective agreements and union 
representation
323
 and even if they would not be held-up by shareholder, the risk of hold-up is 
not eliminated since management can still take advantage of its stronger bargaining position 
in relation to individual workers. And there is no apparent reason, why management would 
                                                 
319
 Summers, Journal of Comparative Corporate Law and Securities Regulation 1982, 4 (2), 155, 157. 
320
 Summers, Journal of Comparative Corporate Law and Securities Regulation 1982, 4 (2), 155, 158.  
321
 While these two can again be subdivided into operational codetermination and corporate codetermination, 
which is the topic of this section. 
322
 See Gelter Harvard International Law Review 2009, 50 (1), 129, 193. 
323
 Summers, Journal of Comparative Corporate Law and Securities Regulation 1982, 4 (2), 155, 159. 
 
 62 
not do that, since directors could either benefit themselves or the shareholders which in turn 
would give the corporation an edge in competing for investors on the capital markets. On the 
other hand it must also be considered that management is arguably more closely supervised in 
the US than in Germany because of potential managerial self-benefitting due to weaker share- 
and stakeholders. This would take some of the mentioned hold-up risk away. 
 
An important reason against the enactment of codetermination in the US and even a still 
prevalent point of criticism in Germany is the risk that codetermination slows down and in the 
worst-case even blocks the management in its decision-making and day-to-day business.
324
  
 
Furthermore, even though the German supervisory board has broad rights to influence the 
actual business making conducted by the management board the two are still separated. The 
US on the other hand does not have such a two-tier system. This increases the difficulty of 
practically implementing codetermination and might additionally raise the risk of delay in 
day-to-day business. Even though the latter one is highly doubtful, since the one-tier board in 
the US is working very similar to the German management and supervisory system by having 
inside (dealing with day-to-day business) and outside (fulfilling supervisory tasks) 
directors.
325
Thus this might not eliminate the risk of delay, but it also will not increase it 
further. 
 
As a result, any potential US codetermination system would need to look very different from 
the German system, due to very different circumstances. But in spite of the mentioned 
problems it would probably still be possible for the US and most other legal systems in that 
matter to create some kind of codetermination framework that accounts for the workers, as the 
most important stakeholders, if there were a broad consensus about the benefits of such a 
system.
326
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5.2.3. Codetermination conclusions 
 
In the end it can only be stated again that codetermination is a very good indicator of a 
stakeholder orientation of a legal system. It will not always be possible to install a 
codetermination system as extensive as in Germany, but it will still be possible to enact some 
kind system of codetermination, which ensures stakeholder interests are considered as well. 
 
Thus, the mere fact whether or not there is some kind codetermination system can be pretty 
telling in regard to the overall orientation of a legal system. Additional looks on the specific 
design of the particular codetermination system and surrounding legal frameworks will 
provide an even more complete picture. This is shown in the case of the shareholder 
capitalistic US system without any form of codetermination and the more stakeholder 
capitalistic German system, with one of the most extensive codetermination frameworks 
around the world. 
 
5.3. Banks’ involvement in executive compensation’s matters in the US and in Germany  
 
This part will now shed more light on the existed relationship between executive 
compensation and the performance of the board and its effects on the shareholders and 
stakeholders debate in both countries aiming to clarify the current situation.  
 
The differing levels of executive compensation in the countries all over the world have 
attracted academics and professional’s attention recently more than ever before. Although 
most of the academic literature has focused primary on examining US executive’s 
compensation, Germany has been one of the countries that has equally challenged researchers, 
since today it constitutes the third largest economy globally.  
 
5.3.1. Legal situation  
 
Before explaining the main differences between USA’s and Germany’s executive 
compensation’s policies’, a brief comparison between the German and American corporate 
governance’s structure is necessary. In particular, there are two main features of German 
governance structure that differ from those in the USA. The first one is that in Germany large 
corporations have a two-tiered board structure. On the one hand there is the “Aufsichtrat” or 
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Supervisory Board and on the other hand there is the “Vorstand” or Managing Board. In the 
USA the corporate governance structure is actually a one tier board
327
. 
 
Therefore, based on German law, among Supervisory Board’s main responsibilities is the 
oversight of the corporation. This responsibility seems to be similar to that of the American 
board of Directors. In addition, the Supervisory Board is responsible for appointing the 
Managing Board and at the same time is asked to set the remuneration of the members of the 
Managing Board
328
. In the USA the top management is the equivalent of the Managing Board 
and for the determination of its salaries there did not really any particularly methodology until 
after Dodd Frank Act’s enactment where Executive Compensation has now been set under 
certain patterns.  
 
Under German law, the Managing Board has also the responsibility to oversight all the daily 
operations of the corporation. A huge difference though between German law and American 
law in this perspective is that under German law commercial banks seem to have a 
tremendous influence on corporate governance compared to the USA. In principle, in the 
USA commercial banks are prohibited in having under their possession any equity of the 
corporations.  
 
Moreover, some voices would advocate that this situation is viewed as quite controversial 
under an American perspective. And a question which is born in this case is: To what extent 
can actually German universal banks impact the governance of one corporation? Although the 
existing evidence cannot really give a prominent answer on this question, it is widely believed 
that the degree of influence of the universal banks over corporate governance’s control 
extends beyond the traditional limitations met between lender-creditor relationship
329
. Taking 
this into account, someone would argue that this relationship creates a different intervention 
rights to the banks in the interior management and at this point the bank as a stakeholder 
could even sometimes influence the board more than the shareholders of the company
330
. 
Under American law that would not be allowed not only since shareholder primacy is the key 
                                                 
327
 Emmons, William R. and Frank A. Schmid, Universal Banking, Control Rights, and Corporate Finance in 
Germany, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review No. 4, Vol. 80, July 19 (1998). 
328
 Id. 
329
 Emmons, William R. and Frank A. Schmid, Universal Banking, Control Rights, and Corporate Finance in 
Germany, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review No. 4, Vol. 80, July 19 (1998).  
330
 Edwards, J.S. and K. Fischer, (1994), The German Financial System, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
 65 
answer to the increase of the corporation’s wealth but also banks, as stakeholder of the 
corporation would never be able to be accounted the same as the real invertors (of course, as 
mentioned just above, banks’ intervention in Corporate Governance’s matters would not be 
allowed by the law). 
 
Towards the same direction, trying to understand German banks’ behavior, Elston is trying to 
explain banks’ most important ways through which a back influences a corporation. In 
particular, banks achieve their influence through a) associated voting rights and bank share 
ownership accrued from proxy votes and ownership, b) bank’s representation on the 
Supervisory Board and c) share underwriting and bank lending. Bank representatives can also 
play an active role as shareholders according to which they can take part in shareholders’ 
annual meetings, and are regularly represented on the Supervisory Board of the corporation 
starting from one to more representatives. Based on the above mentioned, the banks manage 
to have direct influence on the corporation’s operations, a situation that surpasses the 
traditional British-American corporation-creditor relationship
331
.  
 
Therefore, although the banks cannot really have a large portion of the voting right in a 
corporation, by collecting proxy votes
332
 can influence significantly the decisions made by the 
corporation in matters regarding both the remuneration of the Managing Board as well as the 
Supervisory Board. Examining that situation from an agency problem perspective, taking into 
account banks’ intention to hold the shares of the corporations for a long time, that could be 
interpreted as banks aiming at engaging actively on the management (monitoring) of the 
corporation.   
 
To conclude, contrary to what is happening in the USA where the banks have no involvement 
affecting Managing and Supervisory board salaries, in Germany banks are among the most 
important factors, which decide these matters. Hence, it more than important for someone to 
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understand initially the structure of the German style system of the banks before reaching to 
any conclusion. It becomes, thus obvious that in Germany the banks as stakeholders play a 
significant role.  
 
6. Final Conclusion 
 
After all it sure can be stated that the approaches to business of the US and Germany are 
substantially different. Whereas the US is still in large parts characterized by the shareholder 
primacy rule, a relatively stakeholder-friendly legal framework ensures a consideration of 
multiple interests in Germany. This is to a high degree due to different local circumstances 
that shaped the development of today’s legal situation. 
 
But even though both systems are very different from each other, at the end of the day it is 
clear, that no corporate groups can be totally left out of the picture, when a corporations want 
to maximize their success. The question on which group the focus should be on is obviously 
answered different in the US and in Germany, but again due to diverging circumstances and 
even political ideas, the answer needs to be different to maximize corporate efficiency and 
success, which is the central objective of a good corporate governance. 
 
If the circumstances change, so might the overall orientation. A good example of that is a 
progressive shift of focus to more shareholder value creation due to increased market pressure 
in Germany (and also the in the EU)
333
 and in the US there also might be slight changes to a 
broader consideration of interest, e.g. looking at the public benefit corporation. 
 
So even if both systems will probably stay with their overall orientation in the foreseeable 
future change is possible and will likely happen as long as this facilitates the overall corporate 
success. 
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